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FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 15, IAMAW, Lodge 571

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No.81K/00063

and

Accurate Products Co.

The stipulated issue is:
Under the terms of the labor agreement between Accurate Products Co. and District
No. 15 IAMAW, were the grievants improperly paid vacation pay for the years 1979
and 1980? If so what shall be the remedy?
The Company asserts that the grievance as
to 1979 is not arbitrable, which the Union
denies.
A hearing was held at the Company offices in Hillside, New
Jersey on January 20, 1981 at which time representatives of the
above named Union and Company appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived. The
parties filed post-hearing statements.
The Company's assertion that the grievance as it relates to
the year 1979 is not arbitrable, is affirmed. Article XX Section
20.1(b) requires that a grievance be presented by the Union or
the employee aggrieved in writing to the Company within three (3)
working days after the grievance arose, "or the same is forever
barred." The instant grievance was filed in writing with the
Company on July 15, 1980, just short of one year after July 26,
1979 when the vacation pay dispute arose. It is clear that the
Union and the aggrieved employees knew or should have known of
the circumstances which gave rise to the 1979 grievance well before the passage of the almost one year period. Hence, under
the absolute time limit set forth in Section 20.1(b) and under
well settled principles of laches, the instant grievance as it
relates to the year 1979 is time barred and not arbitrable.
With regard to vacation pay for the year 1980, the Union
claims that that portion of vacation taken by employees on and
after August 1, 1980 should be paid for at the higher contract
rates of pay which went into effect on August 1st. The Company
paid vacation pay for the entire vacation period, whether prior

-2to or after August 1, 1980, at the pay rates in effect on June 1,
1980.
I find that Article XIV (Vacations) and particularly Sections
14.1, 14.2 and 14.3 are dispositive of the dispute.
are related and should be read together.

Those Sections

I conclude that the term

"vacation benefits" found in the second sentence of Section 14,1
refers to not only longevity eligibility for vacation and to the
number of days of vacation entitlement, but also to the rate of
pay for each day of vacation.
Determinative in my view is the provision in that second
sentence that vacation benefits shall be determined "as of June
1st of each year...." Unless otherwise limited, and I find no
such limitation in this contract, the benefits to be determined
as of June 1 are the longevity levels, the number of days of
vacation entitlement and the rate of pay for those vacation days.
It is noted that Section 14.2 refers to the rate of pay.

Read

together with Section 14.1, I must conclude therefore that the
reference to benefits "determined as of June 1" includes a rate
of pay for vacation pay as of that date. Reading further, Section
14.3 inter alia determines the vacation for an employee who quit
after June 1st as limited to what had been accrued on June 1st,
prior to his termination. No vacation benefit attaches to the
period of his employment after June 1st.
The foregoing means to me that the benefits of vacation,
including eligibility levels, numbers of days of vacation and the
rate of pay for those days are all measured and determined each
year as of June 1st.

Hence the vacation pay which the Company

paid the grievants for the 1980 vacation period, a portion of
which followed the August 1st contract pay increase, was properly
pegged at the earlier June 1st level.
If this result be inequitable (although in part it is consistent with the theory of accrual for vacation entitlement and
pay) it is merely a reflection of a portion of the present contract
which the parties negotiated (or neglected to change or modify
when they agreed on a date for the contractual wage increase and
different from what had obtained in predecessor contracts.) A
change remains a matter for collective bargaining and not
arbitration.

-3The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance as it relates to
the year 1979 is not arbitrable.
Under the terms of the labor agreement
between Accurate Products Co, and District
No. 15 IAM the grievants were properly
paid vacation pay for the year 1980.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 23, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )S&':
On this day of March 23, 1981, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 15

IAMAW

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330-0178-81

and

Aerospace Division, UOP, Inc.

The issue is:
Is the grievance arbitrable? If so, did
the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement by not paying lead
persons pay to Florence Hull in SeptemberOctober, 1980? If so, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on July 1, 1981 at which time Ms. Hull,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Union and the Company

filed post-hearing briefs.
The Company asserts that the grievance is not arbitrable
because the Union's complaint that the grievant, a veteran Thermo
Machine set-up and operator, was required to "train" another
employee in the set-up and operation of that machine was not part
of the Union's original grievance, and that in any event what the
Company required of the grievant was within the Company's sole
managerial authority under the management rights of the contract.
The grievance procedure and the written grievance which
initiates it are not "common law pleadings."

So long as the
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various claims related to the grievance are raised in the course
of the grievance meetings

those cla£fos-,s whicb <_ue =£-*,. r^lo--**---are... -

unable to resolve directly become arbitrable even if not part
of the bare original grievance in its original written form.
Here the Company acknowledged that at the third step of the
grievance procedure the Union did claim that the grievant was
required by supervision to train and reinstruct Joan Walker who
was inexperienced on that machine and in that classification,
in the set-up and operation of the machine (and not simply to
set-up for her).

Hence the "training" or "instructional" aspects

of the Union's grievance was raised in the grievance meetings,
thereby making that contention an arbitrable issue.
The various management rights provisions of the contract
cited by the Company do not expressly bar from arbitration the
claims by the Union that the grievant was required to perform
duties beyond those of her classification; that those duties
are properly within the higher job classification of lead person
and that the grievant be paid a differential for performing the
higher rated duties.
Whether the management rights provisions of the contract
accord the Company the exclusive right to assign the duties in
question to the grievant

requires an interpretation of those

contract sections and therefore is part of the "merits" of the
case.

As the arbitrator has the jurisdictional authority to

interpret the contract, including the management rights provisions thereof, the dispute over whether those provisions

_o _

support the Company's action, as argued by the Company, is a
matter for the arbitrator.

Hence, the grievance is arbitrable.

On the merits, Section 5.12 Definition of Lead Person
is pertinent.

It reads:

a. A Lead Person is a bargaining unit
employee who, because of his/her knowledge
and skill, has been designated to provide
guidance to other employees in performing
a common operation. A Lead Person cannot
hire or fire, nor recommend that someone be
hired or fired, nor recommend whether or not
another employee should be given a merit
increase.
b 0 A Lead Person position is a temporary
position for the convenience of the Company
for a given period of time. Lead Persons
shall be appointed and relieved of Lead
Person status based upon workload conditions
and management's prerogative. Lead Persons
may receive up to forty cents (40^) an hour
more than the top of his/her base rate of pay
while on Lead Person status. Upon completion
of his/her Lead Person assignment, such employee will revert back to his/her previous
base rate of pay. The Company shall have the
sole and exclusive right to appoint Lead
Persons.
Based on the record, it is clear to me that the grievant's
assignment (over her protest) to work with Joan Walker in settin
up and operating the Thermo machine meets the contractual test
and definition of a Lead Person.
I am satisfied that in this instance, as the Company had
done several times previously without objection by the grievant,
the Company utilized the grievant's extensive experience on and
knowledge of that machine operation to instructrand train anothe
employee who needed that assistance to become fully qualified.
That the grievant did this work on other earlier occasions
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without objection does not transform what meets the definition
of the work of a Lead Person into the regular duties of the
lesser rated Thermo machine operator; nor does it bar her from
now complaining and now seeking Lead Person pay for the time
involved.

Also, just because the Company did not officially

designate her as a Lead Person under Section 5.12 of the contract does not mean that it can with impunity assign job duties
and responsibilities within the Lead -Person :clef itiitton ;and not
pay the higher wage differential.

Indeed, if Lead Person status

and pay wecfe determined solely on whether the affected employee
was officially designated as a Lead Person, the Company could
get higher rated work performed by lower rated employees at
lesser wages without objection.

I do not believe that the

letter or the spirit of Section 5.12 allows that.
Where as here, there are different job classifications
and different pay scales (including the up to 40^ an hour extra
for Lead Person work), there are implicit job duties within each
classification.
less.

Otherwise wage differences would be meaning-

In my view this is true whether or not the job classi-

fications are particularized with job descriptions.

Here,

though there are no job descriptions, the contract provision
for appointment of Lead Persons and for a higher hourly pay
rate for them clearly means that there is a substantive difference between what a Thermo machine set-up and operator may be
required to do and what may be required of a Lead Person.

In

that respect therefore, the jobs have different responsibilities
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and if the former is required to take on what falls within the
latter's classification, an out of title assignment has occurred
warranting a pay adjustment commensurate with the title in which
the work belongs.
The forgoing fact situation which I have found present
in this case is a traditional grievance under virtually all
contracts and is not barred on the merits by the type of
customary and general management rights provisions as are found
in this contract.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, I do

not find that the Company acted properly under Sections 1.2,
7.1 or 5.1 of the contract.

I am satisfied that the instant

dispute involves the interpretation and application of the
contract, particularly Section 5,12 thereof, and is therefore
within the arbitrator's authority under Section 6.2.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
1.

The grievance of Florence Hull is
arbitrable.

2.

The Company violated Section 5.12
of the contract by not paying Lead
Person's pay to Florence Hull in
September-October, 1980. The Company
shall pay Ms. Hull an additional 40^
an hour for the period of time in
those months that, in accordance with
orders from supervision, she worked
with Joan Walker in the set-up and
operation of the latter's Thermo machine.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: November 2, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 2nd day of November, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the forgoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE,
ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America
Local 12781

OPINION AND AWARD
CaSe N°• 80K/11982

and
Allied Chemical Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Has the job of Preventive Maintenance
Inspector been substantially and materially changed under Article XVIII,
Section 4 of the Contract by the introduction of modern tools for equipment
testing? If so, the parties shall attempt
to negotiate a rate in accordance with
Article XVIII, Section 4 of the Contract,
If they are unable to agree on a rate
within 30 days, the matter shall be referred back to this arbitrator for the
establishment of a rate.
A hearing was held in Wilmington, Delaware on December
17, 1980 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived. The Company filed a post-hearing brief.
Prior to the circumstances giving rise to the instant
grievance, Preventive Maintenance Inspectors checked machine
bearings by sight, by feel, by listening, and by the use of a
screwdriver.
If they discerned what they believed to be a problem with a bearing, they would notify an Engineer who would make
a further check with other instruments including a Shock Pulse
Meter.
When the Company assigned the use of the Shock Pulse Meter
to the Preventive Maintenance Inspectors as a substitute for their
observations, listening, feel and use of the screwdriver and also
required the inspectors to keep records of their findings from the
use of the Pulse Meter, the Inspectors and the Union on their
behalf claimed that the Preventive Maintenance Inspector job had
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been substantially and materially changed within the meaning of
Article XVIII Section 4 of the contract, in that the Inspectors
were now required to perform work at the level of the Engineers.
The Union's contentions are not persuasive. As before,
the Inspectors continue to check and inspect bearings for defects.
I am persuaded that an effective inspection using sight, feel,
listening and a screwdriver requires at least as much experience
and sophistication as the use of the Shock Pulse Meter. As a
more modern testing device, the meter is a scientific replacement for what previously had been the inspectors judgement based
on his experience and what he observed or discerned from the old
inspectional method.

Considering the record, particularly the

testimony on how long it takes to learn to use the meter and
record its findings as compared to how long it takes to effectively diagnose a defective bearing from sight, feel, listening
and the use of a screwdriver, I conclude that the new method is
no more complicated, no more demanding, and requires no greater
skills than what was expected of the inspectors previously.
Therefore a mere modernization and/or mechanization of a particular inspectional duty, which requires no greater skill or effort,
does not constitute a substantial or material job change within
the meaning of Article XVIII Section 4 of the contract.
Nor does that level of change come about because the
inspectors now record meter findings in a log. Again I view
this as simply as an updated, more modern and different method
of their doing record keeping which has always been attendant to
the job. I do not find the new record keeping methods
a substantial or material change in the job.

create

That the Engineers used the Shock Pulse Meter before
that instrument was assigned to the bargaining unit inspectors
is not determinative. To my mind that simply means that both
Engineers and Inspectors had concurrent jurisdiction over inspecting bearings, although the initial inspectional work was
done by the bargaining unit Inspectors. The jurisdiction and
sequence has not changed. The Inspectors still perform the
routine work and if they find or suspect defects, call it to the
Engineer's attention. In the absence of a showing that the Shock
Pulse Meter requires greater skill, or is more complex or demanding, or imposes greater responsibility, the mere fact that the

-3meter was first used by the Engineers does not mean that when
it was assigned to the Inspectors that the Inspector classification rose to the Engineer level or underwent a material or substantial change.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The job of Preventive Maintenance
Inspector has not been substantially and materially changed under
Article XVII, Section 4 of the contract by the instroduction of modern
tools for equipment testing.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 25, 1981
STATE OF New York. )' c q .
COUNTY OF New York ) " *
On this 25th day of February, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America
Local 1928

OPINION AND AWARD
Gr- ^ 79.58

and
AMCAR Division, ACF Industries,
Inc., Milton, Pennsylvania

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the discharge of Michael J.
Haley was for proper cause pursuant
to Article III of the Agreement, and
if not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Williamsport, Pennsylvania on October
1, 1980 at which time Mr. Haley, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic

record was taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The charge against the grievant, for which he was discharged
is that he was "sleeping on the job."

His prior disciplinary

record includes a five day suspension and a warning for the same
offense.

Neither of those disciplines were grieved.

The Company's rules provide for a five day suspension for
the first offense of sleeping on the job, and discharge for the
second offense.

The validity of the rules and the measure of

penalty for such an offense are not challenged in this proceeding
Rather, the grievant and the Union on his behalf, deny that he
was sleeping.

Instead, it is asserted that he was working making

the repairs to which he was assigned.
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Though the grievant was not fully and directly observed in
a state of sleep, I find, based on his own equivocal testimony
of the manner and maneuvers involved in placing his crane where
it was; the absence of noise, light or movement from him or
from his location, the unbelievability

of his claim that he

could and was making repairs in the dark without moving and his
inconsistant assertion that he occasionally used a flashlight,
the observations for relevant periods of time by managerial
representatives of his crane from below without any notice of
noise, light or movement, and from two close-in points from
another crane at a parallel height from which the grievant's
protruding legs were seen, again without any movement, noise or
light, the Company had reasonable grounds to conclude that the
grievant was asleep.

I further determine that those reasonable

grounds meet the requisite burden of proof for discipline cases.
As the grievant was previously disciplined for the same
offense his instant discharge was proper in accordance both
with the plant rules and the traditional principles of progressive
discipline.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Michael J. Haley was
for proper cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: January 5, 1981
STATE OF New York )oc
,
oo
COUNTY OF New York )
On this fifth day of January, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 15, International
Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, Local 571
and
AM Varityper, Division of AM
International, Inc.

In accordance with Article XX of the collective bargaining
agreement dated June 1, 1978 between the above named Union and
Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Jeanette Lemma? If not, what shall
be the remedy?

A hearing was held in East Orange, New Jersey on March 25,
1981 at which time representatives of the Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The grievant sustained a foot injury while at work on
December 12, 1979 and received emergency treatment at a hospital.
Although she was told at the hospital that she could return to
work on December 17, on December 14 she complained to Barbara
Livorsi of the Company's Medical Department about her injury.
In response Livorsi arranged for the grievant to visit Dr.
Floriani, an orthopedic specialist, on December 17. The grievant
also visited her personal doctor, Dr. Rispoli, on December 14.
Dr. Floriani examined the grievant on December 17 and indicated
that she could return to work on December 19. On December 18
the grievant returned to Dr. Rispoli who directed her to rest at
home for two weeks and also referred her to an orthopedist, Dr.
Lorello.

On December 19 the grievant did not report to work.

Unable to contact her by telephone, the Company sent her a telegram directing her to report to work as Dr. Floriani had authorized.

On December 19 the grievant also complained about some

related ailments to Livorsi in the Medical Department.

-2Livorsi arranged for the grievant to visit a medical doctor, Dr.
Silk.

On December 20 Dr. Silk examined the grievant and author-

ized her to return to work on January 2, 1980, apparently as a
result of his belief that her job required excessive walking.
After Livorsi advised Dr. Silk that the grievant's job did not
require excessive walking, Dr. Silk reexamined the grievant on
December 22 and changed the January 2, 1980 date to December 26,
1979. On December 26 the grievant did not report to work and
notified the Company at 1:45 p.m. that she was ill. That day
the grievant also visited Dr, Rispoli who determined that she
could report to work on December 31, On December 27 the grievant
did not report to work so the Company discharged her. Unknown
to the Company at the time, Dr. Floriani examined the grievant
on December 27 and authorized her to return to work on December
31,
The Company contends that the grievant has a record of
excessive absenteeism; that she received a leave of absence to
recover from her foot injury; and that she overextended the leave
of absence without providing the relevant information to or
receiving the necessary authorization from the Company.

The Union

argues that the grievant's attendance record is nothing to be
proud of but that the discharge is based solely on overextending
the leave of absence.

In this regard the Union claims that the

injury is undisputed; that the grievant visited a number of
doctors; that the injury triggered additional ailments; and that
the Company acted prematurely by discharging her on December 27,
1979.

The Union insists that the grievant notified the Company

that she would be absent on December 26 and, 'lf_Jshe^could, that
she would return to work on December 27.

Thus it is the Union's

position that the grievant complied with the leave of absence
requirements

contained in the Agreement.

The record indicates that the Company routinely grants a
medical leave of absence when an employee is injured at work.
Although the duration of such a leave of absence may be uncertain
due to the unpredictability of a patient's response to medical
treatment, this is the first time that the parties have disagreed
about when an employee should return to work. It is undisputed
that at various times either the hospital, the Company's doctors,
or the grievant's doctors authorized the grievant to return to

-3work on December 17, 19, 26, 31, 1979 and January 2, 1980.

On

reflection it seems that the use of different sets of doctors
resulted in a delay between the time each doctor made a finding
and when the Company learned of that finding.

Consequently, the

Company discharged the grievant on December 27 without having
learned that as of that date Dr. Rispoli and Dr. Floriani had
fixed the date for the grievant to return to work as of December
31.
A principal is bound when its agent possesses actual or
apparent authority to act on his behalf. The Company directed
the grievant to see Dr. Floriani for a medical examination.

As

a result, Dr. Floriani became the agent of the Company. When
Dr. Floriani authorized the grievant to remain out of work until
December 31, the Company became bound. That the Company did not
learn of Dr. Floriani's action until after the Company had discharged the grievant

does not negate the authority of the. doctor

to bind the Company. The evidence indicates that this was the
first time that the Company had sent one of its employees to Dr.
Floriani. Although this may explain why there was a delay in
communicating between the Company and the doctor, the authority
of the doctor to bind the Company still obtained.

The Company

therefore acted improperly and prematurely by discharging the
grievant on December 27 since the Company through its agent had
extended the grievant's leave of absence until December 31.

For

this reason the grievant did not violate Article XVIT (c) of
the Agreement. She did not overstay a leave of absence without
permission. Accordingly, I find that there was not just cause
for the discharge of the grievant.
With respect to the remedy, I find that the grievant is not
entitled to back pay.

First, she was the only person who had

complete knowledge about the constantly changing dates that the
various doctors had fixed for her to return to work. An employee
has an obligation to inform her employer of relevant medical
information concerning her availability for work especially when
that information

is not otherwise available to her employer.

The

grievant had a right to consult with her own doctors but she had
a corresponding duty to inform her employer in a timely manner of
the advice that her doctors had given her. For the grievant to
have waited until January 16 to inform the Company that Dr. Rispoli

-4had set December 31, 1979 as the date when she could return to
work violated her duty to inform the Company in a timely manner
of this information.

Similarly, the grievant violated this duty

by failing to inform the Company of Dr. Lorello's findings, there
by depriving the Company of this information until it received
a letter dated January 14, 1980 from Dr. Lorello on January 22.
The information from these doctors was of critical importance for
the Company to have had a full understanding of the grievant"s
medical condition. The grievant must share responsibility for
witholding this information.
Second, the grievant testified that from the date of her
discharge on December 27, 1979 until the date of the arbitration
hearing on March 25, 1981, she had not filed any job applications
to seek another position. A grievant has an affirmative duty to
seek employment in a related capacity during the period when a
discharge or suspension grievance is pending.

The simple filing

of a grievance does not create a privilege to remain idle.

Of

course, so long as the employee makes a reasonable, good faith
effort to secure employment, back pay will not be deprived even
if the grievant is unsuccessful in actually obtaining a job.

In

the instant case I find that the grievant did not make a reasonable, good faith effort to obtain another position and she thereby violated the duty to mitigate the potential liability.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
There was not just cause for the discharge
of Jeanette Lemma. She shall be reinstated
but without back pay.

Eric J, Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 27, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

'

On this 27th day of May, 1981 before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco
Workers International Union of
America, AFL-CIO, CLC, Local No. 69

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Arnold Bakers, Inc.

In accordance with Article XV of the collective bargaining agreement dated May 17, 1980 between the above named Union
and Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Was the Company's action in discharging
Willie Barber in violation of the collective bargaining agreement? If so, what
shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held in Greenwich, Connecticut on May 21
and June 1, 1981 at which time Mr. Barber, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was expressly waived.
The Company discharged the grievant effective October 20,
1980 for striking or punching Srecko Bakija on October 9, 1980.
In imposing the penalty of discharge, the Company relied on
Article III (3) of the collective bargaining agreement which
provides:
Striking another employee is considered
a serious infraction of both the Company
and Union rules and the penalty shall be
discharge for those found guilty of such
action. The Company and the Union agree
that discharge is the proper penalty for
such action.
This bilaterally negotiated provision clearly and unequivocally sets discharge as the mandated penalty once the

-2-

Company has proved the substantive offense of striking another
employee.

Thus the Arbitrator is contractually required to

treat the alleged offense, if proved, as one that justifies
summary discharge regardless of the grievant's past record,
length of service, or any other mitigating factor.

In short,

because discharge is the contractual penalty for that kind of
offense, this Arbitrator cannot substitute his judgement for
that of the Company even if he believes that a long term suspension would be sufficiently protective of the Company's rights
and interests.
At the outset, I reject the Union's contention that Bakija
who was the Union President at the time of the incident as well as
thereafter, is not an employee within the meaning of Article III
(3).

Article I of the agreement specifies that an employee "shall

mean (a) member of the Union as referred to in this agreement."
The agreement further provides in Article XII that:
The Company shall grant a leave of absence...
without loss of seniority to the duly elected
President of the Union for the purpose of
performing the duties of such office.... The
President of the Union upon returning to his
regular work, shall retain his seniority and
bumping rights to his former classification,
By retaining his seniority and bumping rights under the
foregoing circumstances, means that he retained his "employee"
status.

Also, the Company stated that it considers Bakija to be

an active employee.

Accordingly, I find that Bakija is an employee

within the meaning of Article I of the agreement and is perforce
an employee within the meaning of Article III

(3).

With respect to the substantive charge, the evidence is
is clear that the grievant struck or punched Bakija.

Bakija

-3-

testified that he and the grievant were discussing the allocation
of overtime work at which time the grievant voiced certain objections.

The conversation occurred in the Shipping Department, dur-

ing working hours, at or near the grievant's work location.

Bakija

testified that he started to walk away from the grievant when he
considered the conversation to have ended.

The grievant thereupon

called Bakija's name and, when Bakija responded by turning around,
the grievant struck him on the chin.

Bakija indicated that he

fell to the ground and that the grievant stood over him rather
closely.

The Personnel Representative, Michael D. Farquhar,

testified that he saw Bakija shortly thereafter and that Bakija
indicated that the grievant had hit him.

Farquhar also testified

that he observed that Bakija had a bruise on his left cheek and
another one on his chin.
The grievant admits that he "reached and grabbed" Bakija
and "pulled" Bakija toward him but denies that he punched Bakija.
Instead, the grievant asserts that a fellow employee, Teddy Carroll,
interceded immediately after the grievant had grabbed Bakija.

The

grievant contends that when Carroll sought to separate the two men
Bakija stumbled over an empty dolly and thereby sustained the
facial injuries.

Carroll's testimony affirmed the grievantfs

version of the incident.
In analyzing the testimony of the various witnesses, I
accept Bakija's version of the incident as credible and accurate.
I do not find any reason why Bakija would bear false witness
against the grievant.

There is no evidence of a history of

animosity between the two employees.

In fact, the behavior of

the two employees at the hearing suggested that a cordial relationship existed between them.

The reluctance of Bakija to testify--

-4as evidenced by the need for the Company to subpoena him-further demonstrates Bakija's concern for the grievant's predicament.

Therefore, I find Bakija's testimony to be accurate regarding

what transpired on October 9, 1980.

Those witnesses who testified

otherwise were not, in my view, objective about the event.
Although I have found that the grievant struck or punched
Bakija, it is well settled that an innocent victim who merely
protects himself against an unprovoked assault should not be
disciplined for having engaged in fighting.

In the instant case,

however, the grievant was the aggressor and not the victim.
Although he may have been upset concerning the allocation of
overtime work, such displeasure does not constitute provocation
to engage in fisticuffs.

As the grievant is a long term employee

and a former union official, he knew or should have known that
the proper reaction should have been to grieve if he was dissatisfied with the overtime arrangement.

There is no contractual

basis for the Arbitrator to excuse the grievant's conduct.

I

therefore find, that: the grievant violated Article III (3) by
striking or punching Bakija; and that the discharge did not violate
the agreement.
Mitigation of the decision to discharge the grievant because of his long years of service is a matter within the exclusive
discretion of the Company.

I believe that with its right to dis-

charge for such an offense clearly upheld by this decision, the
Company would not undermine its disciplinary authority if it now
decided without prejudice or precedent to reduce the penalty to a
long term suspension.

A suspension of approximately nine months,

would, clearly, unequivocally, and effectively convey to all

-5concerned

the serious and indefensible nature of the offense.

At

the same time, reinstatement restores the grievant to a livelihood
in which he invested 22 years.

And, of equal importance, it

enables the Company to regain a seemingly well respected employee
who, but for a spontaneous, and probably isolated act, would have
presumably continued contributing productively to the success of
the Company.

I therefore strongly recommend that the Company

'• reinstate the grievant to his former position without back pay.
However, any such change in the penalty from discharge to suspension, is a matter solely for the Company's consideration.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company's action in discharging Willie
Barber did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 2, 1981
STATE OF New York )gg
COUNTY OF New York )
On this second day of July,
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
the individual described in and who
ment and he acknowledged to me that

1981 before me personally came
known and known to me to be
executed the foregoing instruhe executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union No. 369, Utility
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO

rm-nuT/™
T-™™AT
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN

and
Boston Edison Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by changing the
work day for certain Service Department employees from a straight 8-hour
day with a paid lunch period to an 8~
hour day with an unpaid lunch period
or by making resulting schedule changes
effective as March 17, 1979? If so,
what shall be the remedy, if any?
A hearing was held on June 3, 1980 in Braintree,
Massachusetts at which time representatives of the above named
Union and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses. The Oath of the Board of Arbitration was waived.

A

stenographic record was taken and the parties filed post-hearing
briefs. The Board of Arbitration met in executive session on
January 27, 1981.
I find contractual support for part but not all of what the
Company did.
Article XI Section 6(a) gives the Company the right to
change the starting and ending time of a work day by as much as
forty-five minutes.

In the instant case the Company changed the

starting times of both the first and second shifts by scheduling
them one-half hour earlier, and changed the ending time of the
midnight shift, by making it one-half hour later.
The starting times of the first and second shift had been
1 AM and 4 PM respectively. They were changed to 12:30 AM and
3:30 PM respectively. The midnight shift previously ended at
8 AM.

It was changed to an 8:30 AM ending.

-2Those changes standing alone are in accordance with
Article XI Section 6(a) which reads:
6.

The following shall not constitute
a change in the final posted schedule.
(a) A change of forty-five (45) minutes
or less of the time for starting and
ending one or more work days from the
times posted in the applicable work
schedule.

But that is not all the Company did.

It also eliminated

what previously had been a paid lunch period within the original
shift hours. Instead, under the new schedule, the 20 minute lunch
period is now unpaid. As a consequence the employees are on the
Company's premises from the start to the end of their new daily
work schedule an additional one-half hour. Article XI Section 6
(a) makes no mention of changes in the lunch period.

Hence that

Section neither contemplated nor authorizes the Company to alter
the nature of the lunch period when it exercises its right to
change the starting or ending hours of the work day.
The Company asserts that an unpaid lunch period is contracually authorized by Article XI Section 2 of the contract, and
that the paid lunch period previously accorded the employees in
the Transportation Division involved in this grievance was contrary to the contract and hence may be unilaterally changed by
the Company.

I do not find Article XI Section 2 to be that explicit;

indeed I find it ambiguous.

Said Section reads:

2. The hours of a work day, as posted,
shall be consecutive, except for time
out for meals, but in positions where
the nature of the work requires continuous operation eight (8) consecutive
hours may be worked, during which lunch
may be eaten without interruption to
service or deduction in pay. Such time
out for meals, in those operations where
time is usually taken out for meals, shall
commence not less than four (4) nor more
than five (5) hours after the scheduled
starting time.
The phrase
the hours of a work day, as posted, shall
be consecutive except for time out for meals,

-3cannot be construed solely as providing for an unpaid meal period.
As work is not performed normally during a meal period, the reference to the consecutive hours of the work day may logically apply
to the hours of productive work and not the period for meals. But
that does not mean that the phrase
except for time out for meals
means an unpaid meal period. Rather, as the work day is defined
by Article X Section 1 as consisting of eight hours, the above
mentioned phrase can logically mean nonetheless that the time out
for meals, though paid for, is part of the eight hour work day
within the meaning of Article X Section 1, but not part of the
consecutive hours during which employees are at work.
The balance of the relevant part of Article XI Section 2
is equally susceptible to different interpretations.

The provisio

Where the nature of the work requires
continuous operation eight (8) consecutive hours may be worked, during which
lunch may be eaten without interruption
to service or deduction in pay.
can mean that in situations of continuous operations employees
may not stop their productive activity during the lunch period
but may be required to work during that period. It follows that
'
except for a continuous operation, when employees involved therein
may be required to work through the lunch period, other employees,
including those involved in this case not only have the lunch
period as off-time but that such lunch period still falls within
the same work day, and is paid time.

That employees of continuous

operations suffer no "deduction in pay" when they work through
their lunch period,does not carry with it a clear enough implication that other employees, not involved in continuous operations,
must take the meal period on an unpaid basis and outside of the
normal work day.
Under the foregoing circumstances though the Company had
the contractual right to begin the first and second shifts onehalf hour earlier and end the midnight shift one-half hour later,
it did not have the right to unilaterally terminate the paid lunch
period, which by practice, had become not only a condition of
employment, but also by practice, an interpretation of unclear
contract language.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union No. 369, Utility
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO

AWARD

and

Boston Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties make the following AWARD:
1. The Company had the right to begin
the first and second shifts one-half
hour early and end the midnight shift
one-half an hour later.
2. The Company did not have the right
to change the paid lunch period to an
unpaid lunch period. The Company is
directed to restore the paid lunch period
as part of the work day.
3. As the grievants were required to remain on Company premises one-half an hour
beyond their previously scheduled eight
hour shift, they shall be paid for that
additional time for the period involved
in accordance with the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement.

Eric J.Schmertz
Chairman

Donald E. Wightman
Concurring In
Dissenting From

John J. Godfrey
Concurring In
Dissenting From

-2DATED: April 17, 1981
STATE OF New York )
County of New York )ss':
On this seventeenth day of April, 1981, before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

DATED: April
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1981
)
)

:

On this
day of April, 1981, before me personally came
and appeared Donald E. Wightm-n to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: April
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1981
)
).

On this
day of April, 1981, before me_ personally came
and appeared John J. Godfrey to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Locals 269, 386 and 387 Utility
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO

AWARD

and
Boston Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of
Arbitration, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties make the following AWARD:
1. The Company did not violate the
collective bargaining agreement by
passing on to employees increased
premium costs for dependents' coverage under the Hospital and Surgical
Benefits Plan or the Dental Plan
effective as of May 1, 1979.
2. The Company shall give an accounting to the Union within 15 days of the
date hereof, concerning the total costs
and cost allocations by benefit or group
of benefits showing the Company and employee
contributions in dollar amounts and percentages for the benefits under the Hospital
and Surgical Benefits Plan and the Dental
Plan. The Board retains jurisdiction for
this purpose and for further actions in
that connection as may be needed.

Eric J, Schmertz
Chairman

Donald E. Wightman
Concurring in
Dissenting from

John J. Godfrey
Concurring in
Dissenting from

DATE: APRIL 17, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ss -:
On this 17th day of April, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowedged to me that he executed
MELANIB S. ADLER
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 30-^<tc432
Qualified in NiiMaa County
Commission Empires Mar. 30, \),

DATED: April
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1981

On this
day of April, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Donald E. Wightman to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

DATED: April
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1981

On this
day of April, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared John J. Godfrey to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Locals 269, 386 and 387 Utility
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN

and
Boston Edison Company
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreements by passing on to
employees increased premium costs for
dependents' coverage under the Hospitalization and Surgical Benefits Plan or
the Dental Plan effective as of May 1,
1979? If so, what shall the remedy be,
if any?
A hearing was held in Braintree, Massachusetts on January
27, 1981 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
The Arbitrators' Oath was waived. A stenographic record was taken
and post-hearing briefs were filed by both sides,, The Board of
Arbitration met in executive session on March 17, 1981.
The evidence submitted and the arguments advanced by the
parties gave an exhaustive analysis of the history and development
of the Hospitalization and Surgical Benefits Plan since its inception in or about 1943. From a plan that covered basic hospital
ization and surgical benefits in the 1940's, modifications and
improvements made in the Plan since 1950, when the first collective bargaining agreements were concluded between the Company and
Locals 369, 386 and 387, have made it a health benefit program
that today ranks among the best in the utility industry.
Notwithstanding the developments and achievements, questions have arisen from time to time resolution of which required
reference to arbitration.
One such is now before this Board. It arises under the
contracts negotiated by the parties in the spring of 1977. The
contracts became effective as of May 16, 1977 for Locals 369 and
386, and as of June 12, 1977 for Local 387.
The three Memoranda of Agreement executed by the parties
contain the following identical language insofar as the Hospitalization and Surgical Benefits Plan is concerned:

-2Hospital Expenses:
There will be a daily room and board rate adjustment on
October 15, 1977 effective for confinements on or after November
1, 1977 for the purpose of adjusting the average rates then in
effect in the said listed 25 hospitals.
There will be a daily room and board rate adjustment on
October 15, 1978 effective for confinements on or after November
1, 1978 for the purpose of adjusting the average rates then in
effect in the said listed 25 hospitals.
There will be a daily room and board rate adjustment on
October 15, 1979 effective for confinements on or after November
1, 1979 for the purpose of adjusting the average rates then in
effect in the said listed 25 hospitals.
The maximum reimbursement for special services will be
maintained at fifteen (15) times the room and board rate subject
to adjustment resulting from the November 1, 1977, November 1,
1978 and November 1, 1979 readjustment.
The above adjustments will be subject to the 10.5%
dependent contribution.
The following Hospital and Surgical items effective May
16, 1977 will not be subject to any increased dependent
contribution:
Major Medical:
The maximum benefit for each covered person shall be
increased from $75,000 to $150,000.
Reduce deductible from $100 to $75.
Reduce family deductible from $200 to $150.
Add a Major Medical stop loss provision at $5,000 of
covered benefits,
Surgical:
The unit relative value scale shall be increased from $6
to $7 with a maximum benefit of $1,050.
In-Hospital Medical:
Increase to $10 for first day and $7 each day thereafter
for 119 days.
A Coordination of Benefits Clause will be added to the
Hospitalization and Surgical Benefits Plan.
All other provisions of the Hospitalization and Surgical
Benefits Plan as amended, shall continue in effect.

-3The Union reads the agreements as a commitment by the
Company to absorb all of the increased premium costs for dependents' benefits associated with the improvements negotiated, including the increased premiums effective May 1, 1979, except for
the 10.5% dependents' contribution for daily room and board
adjustments .
The Company reads the Memoranda differently.

In its view

it agreed in the negotiations that only certain specified benefit
improvements would not be subject to any increase dependent
contributions and that that limitation would be applicable to the
rates which obtained at that time, but that subsequent increases
in the rates for those benefits, as well as rate increases for
the other parts of the Plan, would be subject to the 10,5%
dependent contribution.
I find the Memoranda sufficiently clear to provide answers
to the issue. It does not support the Union's position that "the
language in the 1977 Memoranda of Agreement specifically delineates that certain costs under the Plan, i.e. the daily room and
board rate adjustment, shall be subject to the 10.5% dependent
contribution while the rest of the Hospital and Surgical Benefits
Plan is exempt from any increased contribution,"
The Memoranda specifically speak of hospital and surgical
items listed and not of the Hospitalization and Surgical Benefits
Plan.

Therefore the only items which were not subject to any in-

creased dependent contribution are the improvements referred to
under the headings Major Medical, Surgical, and In-Hospital
Medical.
This is neither altered nor negated by the prior arbitration Awards or other exhibits submitted into evidence.

In none

of these could I find support for the proposition that in the
1977 negotiation the Company waived its rights to a dependents'
contribution for increases in rates other than those specified,
nor do I find any waiver of its right to require a 10.57o
dependent contribution of rate increases for those specified
items in subsequent years.

Significantly the Memoranda state

that there would be no increased dependent contribution for the
Hospital and Surgical items effective May 16,1977. To my mind
that means that there was to be no increased dependent contribution for the increased costs attendant to the improved benefits
in those items under the rates effective as of May 16, 1977.

-4To make the limitation effective and applicable to future
rate increases would, in my judgement, require explicit obligatory language which would bind the Company into the future to
rate increases of an unknown magnitude.

The Memoranda contain

no such essential provision and therefore the Company is not so
bound.
With regard to the Dental Plan, the Union's case is not
supported either by the 1977 Memoranda or the Mittenthal
Arbitration Award of 1973.

The Memoranda make no mention of the

Dental Plan nor of the dental benefits.

Any increases in premium

therefore are to be treated under the final paragraph of the 1977
Memoranda which reads:
"All other provisions of the Hospitalization and Surgical Benefits Plan as
amended shall continue in effect."
Accordingly the dental feature is to be treated as
continuing in effect, unchanged from the 1975 collective bargaining agreement.

The Company's contribution to the premium is

determined by the modified Mittenthal formula without regard to
future premium increases.

Therefore rate increases for dental

benefits for employees and dependents may be passed on by the
Company to the employees.
At the January 27, 1981 hearing the Union requested that
if this Board decided the Company has the right to pass on the
increased premium costs for dependent coverage - and we have so
decided - that the Board retain jurisdiction for the purpose of
determining whether the costs passed on to the employees were
accurate. The Company agreed to this retention of jurisdiction.
The Union is entitled to receive from the Company a breakdown of the total cost and cost allocation by benefit, or group
of benefits, showing Company and employee contributions in dollar
amount and percentages.
Though we retain jurisdiction for this purpose, the holding of a subsequent hearing may not be necessary.

An explanatory

memorandum from the Company to the Union may resolve this, and
the Board directs that such a memorandum be given.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Workers Union of America,
Local 369

A W A R D
Case #1130-0262-81

and
Boston Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above named parties, make the following AWARD:

The Company violated the collective
bargaining agreement by its suspension or discharge of the grievant,
Lee E. Huggins. Mr. Huggins shall
be reinstated with back pay and
benefits.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Donald E. Wightman
Concurring

John J. Godfrey
Dissenting
DATED: September 10, 1981
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 10th day of September, 1981 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

-2-

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)
)

''

On this
day of September, 1981 before me personall^
came and appeared Donald E e Wightman to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)
)"

On this
day of September, 1981 before me personally
came and appeared John J. Godfrey to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Workers Union of America,
Local 369

OPINION OF
CHAIRMAN
Case #1130-0262-81

and
Boston Edison Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by its suspension
or discharge of the grievant, Lee E.
Huggins? If so, what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on April 21, June 10 and June 15, 1981
at which time Mr. Huggins, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

With the Undersigned as Chairman, Messrs. Donald E.

Wightman and John J. Godfrey served respectively as the Union
and Company arbitrators on the Board of Arbitration.
Arbitrators' Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record was taken;

both sides filed post-hearing briefs and the Board met in
executive session on August 18, 1981.
Not only is this a discharge case, but the charge against
the grievant parallels a criminal offense.

Though there is some

:

evidence which suspiciously suggests the grievant's knowledge
of, if not responsibility for the improper meter by-pass, the
totality of the evidence adduced by the Company falls short of
meeting its burden of establishing the grievant's culpability

-2-

by the "clear and convincing" standard required in such cases.
For example, in my view, the fact that the illegal
electrical by-pass was openly discernible and clearly observable
to meter readers and to Company inspectors; remained so for an
extended period of time during regular meter readings

(and

during periods of fluctuations in the grievant's electric bills)
and that the grievant took no steps to hide it or to connect
it differently at those times or later, when the Company
commenced a general investigation of this type of offense by its
employees (an investigation which I believe the employees knew
of irrespective of whether or not it was publicized) casts
sufficient doubt on what the grievant knew or did in connection
with the meter by-pass as to render inadequate as probative
evidence the other, largely circumstantial aspects of the
Company's case.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: September 10, 1981

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 387, Boston Edison Clerical
Workers Union
AWARD
and

Boston Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, make the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the
collective bargaining agreement
by its discharge of Benny Stanley.

DATED: November 12, 1981
STATE
TATE OF
OF New
New York )
VD S •.
OUNTY OF New York )'

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

On this 12th day of November, 1981 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the forgoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
OUNTY OF

)o00
.
o• *
)

Robert A. Scannell
Concurring

On this
day of November, 1981 before me personally came
and appeared Robert A 0 Scannell to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the forgoing instrumen
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTYOF

) ss> .
)

Joseph C. Faherty
Dissenting

On this
day of November, 1981 before me personally came
and appeared Joseph C. Faherty to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the forgoing instrume
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION
Local 387, Boston Edison Clerical
Workers Union

and

of
CHAIRMAN

Boston Edison Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by its discharge
of the grievant Benny Stanley? If so,
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Boston, Massachusetts on June 15,
1981 at which time the grievant and representatives of the above
named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitration Board consisted of

the Undersigned as Chairman and Messrs. Joseph C 0 Faherty and
Robert A. Scannell as the Union and Company designees respectively
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs and the Board of Arbitration met in executive session on
November 2, 1981.
As the final step in the application of progressive
discipline, the Company discharged the grievant on February 24,
1981 for his use of abusive, disrespectful and threatening
language to his supervisor after being suspended for failing to
adequately respond to questions concerning his work performance.
Previously, the grievant, with about five years of service,
had been formally warned for various infractions and received &

-2three day suspension in January, 1981 for his refusal to carry
out a work order.

The warnings were not challenged in arbitra-

tion and the suspension was upheld in arbitration.
In the instant case the Union claims that over a period
of time the grievant had been harrassed by his supervisor^

that

what the grievant said to his supervisor was an isolated angry
response to the supervisor's persistent and provocative
ing and to the suspension

question-

imposed on the grievant for not

answering to the supervisor's satisfaction; and that the grievant'
words were not as abusive or threatening as is the Company's
version of what was said.
I reject as unproved the Union's claim that the grievant
has been subject to harrassment.

The Stutz decision, the grievant

prior disciplinary record, and the evidence in this case point in
a different direction.

I conclude that supervision was properly

directing the grievant's work assignments and performance, and
that the grievant was unable or unwilling to take direction or
to respond to legitimate inquiries regarding his work.
As to the grievant's acknowledged intemperate remarks, I
conclude that both versions of what he said, his and that of the
Company are not significantly or substantively different.

Both,

including what he and the Union claims he said are abusive,
combative, defiant and threatening.

I find no reason to excuse

him, even if I accepted his version of his remarks.

What he

admits he said constitutes classical insubordination for which
arbitrators consistently uphold disciplinary penalties including

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 880 Massachusetts Hospital
Workers

OPINION
Case #1130 0851 79

and
Cape Cod Hospital

The stipulated issues are:
1. Was there just cause for the five
day suspension of William Dolan in
March, 1979? If not what shall be
the remedy?
2.

Was there just cause for the discharge of William Dolan in June,
1979? If not what shall be the
remedy?

Hearings were held on April 15 and 27, 1981 at which time
Mr. Dolan, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared. All
concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The Employer filed a post-hearing

brief; the Union made oral summation argument.
I accept as credible and accurate the testimony of Nurse
Fulcher, Supervising Nurse Cxypoliski, and former stockroom
assistant supervisor Todd.

Their testimony of the events involvec

in both issues was clear and explicit.

I find no reason in the

record why they would lie or otherwise so specifically misrepresent what they saw and heard and what happened.

-2-

Accordingly I conclude that in March 1979 the grievant was
discourteous, disrespectful and uncooperative to nurses Fulcher
and Cxypolski.

That the nurses were not his direct supervisors

does not excuse his rude, insulting and provocative remarks to
them.

The working relationship between both nurses and the

grievant require mutual cooperation, civility and respect.

The

grievant's breach of those fundamental conditions of that working
relationship, irrespective of whether the nurses are "superior"
to him justify discipline.

I do not find the imposed five day

suspension to be excessive; and therefore that suspension is
upheld.
The evidence clearly establishes that in June, 1979 the
grievant did not perform his work duties in connection with the
collection of linens, and when asked about those duties was
abusive, insulting and disrespectful to a managerial employee
who undisputedly, was his superior.

Thereafter, at the grievance

meeting scheduled to deal with that misconduct, the grievant
further verbally abused, insulted and vilified Todd with obscene
language and characterizations.
It is well settled that the latter two foregoing circumstance
constitute classical examples of insubordination for which
discipline, including summary discharge is justified.

Hence the

Employer's decision to impose the ultimate discipline - dismissal
cannot be faulted or reversed by the Arbitrator.

DATED: June 22, 1981

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 880 Massachusetts Hospital
Workers
and

A W A R D
Case #1130 0851 79

Cape Cod Hospital

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The five day suspension and the discharge of William Dolan were for just
cause.

ME1ANIE S. '-ADLBR
Notary Public, State of New York;
No. 30-4668432
Qualified in Nassau County

•uwdMioa EXPte Mar. 30, 19*2
DATED: June 22, 1981
STATE OF New York ) s s . :
COUNTY OF New York )

-. * ~
„
EtiC J . / ' S c h m e r t Z

Arbitrator

On this 22nd day of June, 1981, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

In the Matter of the "Hypothetical"
Arbitration Under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement
between
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company

OPINION

and

International Associates of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers Lodge 645
and

International Molders and Allied Workers
AFL-CIO, Local 250

Under the collective bargaining agreement dated June 24, 1979
to June 24, 1982 between the above named parties, and for the
private, internal study and consideration of the Company, the
Company has submitted to the Undersigned for an impartial advisory
Opinion the following issues:
1.

Under Article I (b) or (c), and the contract as a whole, is the Company prohibited from subcontracting products whole
or in part on a permanent basis to another
(stranger) company?

2.

Under Article I (b) or (c), and the contract as a whole, is the Company prohibited from transferring products whole or
in part to another CP (member) company?

3.

Is Article I (b) or (c) limited solely to
a proscription of temporary subcontracting
to a stranger company by use of the term
"farm out" as opposed to contract out or
subcontract, for economic reasons?

Article I (b) reads:
The Company agrees that the making, assembling, erection, dismantling and repairing of
machinery of all descriptions performed by or
on the premises of the Company, either directly
or when contracted to a contractor, unless
covered by a manufacturers guarantee, or that
requiring special skills not available within
the bargaining unit, is recognized as coming
within the jurisdiction of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
and/or International Molders and Allied Workers
Union - A.F.L. - C.I.O.

-2Article I (c) reads:
So long as appropriate equipment and qualified employees in this bargaining unit are available, the Company shall not farm out work on
products normally produced by the employees in
this bargaining unit at a time when any of them
are on lay off or not working a normal week in
those rosters which would normally do the work
farmed out, or when such action would necessitate
a lay off or a reduction in the normal (straight
time) employment in those rosters which would
normally do the work farmed out.
Subsumed within the above issues and related thereto, are
the following additional questions posed by the Company:
A.

Does the use of the words "contracted" in
Article I (b) and "farm out" in I (c) have
different meanings? For example does either
apply to the transfer of work to an outside
or stranger company while the other applies
to the transfer of work to another Chicago
Pneumatic facility? Does one term apply to
the temporary transfer of work while the other
applies to a permanent assignment or transfer?

B.

In any event, under Article XXXIV (Management
Rights) and Article XXXVI (Severance Allowance)
may the Company contract or farm out work
irrespective of the provisions of Article I (b)
and I (c) so long as it pays a severance allowance to the employees terminated as a result?

Obviously the threshold question is whether the words "contracted" and "farm out" found respectively in Articles I (b) and
I (c) have different meanings or are synonymous.

In the absence

of any evidence, either in the contract or otherwise, providing
different definitions or interpretations of those two words they
should be given their customary and traditional meanings.

In my

experience, and I am satisfied that the cases support this view,
both words are customarily used interchangeably and have the same
meaning.

Both mean the assignment or transfer of work normally

performed by the bargaining unit or which the bargaining unit has
the skills, equipment and manpower to perform, to non-bargaining

-3unit employees whether the latter be stranger companies, outside
vendors or other facilities of the employer not covered by the
collective bargaining agreement involved.
I find nothing in the instant collective bargaining agreement
nor has there been any other evidence submitted in the record
which would provide a substantive distinction between or any
differing interpretations for these two words.

There are only twc

evidentiary explanations in the record for the use of both words
and both explanations fail to alter the customary meaning.

First

the two foregoing contract Articles were negotiated at different
times, Article I (b) in 1950 and Article I (c) in 1952.

The diff-

erent periods of time that each clause came into the contract may
explain why two words which otherwise are customarily interchangeable were used.

If so, and without any other reason, the tradi-

tional synonymousness of both is not altered and both should be
interpretated the same way, although under Articles I (b) and I
(c), the type of work contracted out or farmed out may be different.
The other evidence is that the Unions, as a matter of practice, have taken the position that Article I (b) is applicable to
maintenance work in connection with the machinery referred to
therein and that Article I (c) is applicable to other types of
work covered by the contract.

Obviously that distinction relates

only to the type of work sent to an outsider, but it does not
provide any differentiation or distinction in meaning between the
two words themselves.
Therefore, with only these positions in the record, neither
of which alters the customary meaning of contracting out or farming out, I must conclude that both words mean
be treated synonymously under this contract.

the same and shoul

-4Under the foregoing interpretation it is immaterial in my
view whether the farm out or contracting out is of short term,
long term, temporary or permanent duration. As the act of contract
ing or farming out occurs when the work is assigned or transferre*
to non-bargaining unit employees, the propriety of that act, at
the time it takes place, turns on whether it is in compliance wit!
Articles I (b) and I (c) of the contract and does not turn on sue
a subsequent factor as how long term or ad hoc the transfer or
assignment may be.

The fact is that the removal of work normally

performed by the bargaining unit or which the unit is capable of
performing, is potentially damaging and prejudicial to the job
security of the unit members, albeit in different degrees, whethe
the farm out or contracting out is of small or large quantity, of
short or long term, or even if permanent.

It is to that potentia

prejudice that Articles I (b) and I (c) are directed.

Hence they

are applicable when the contracting or farm out first occurs
irrespective of the quantity of the work or the duration involved
Again, under the traditional synonymousness of the terms
contracting and farming out, I consider it immaterial whether the
work is sent to a stranger company, or to another facility of
Chicago Pneumatic not covered by the instant collective bargainin
agreement.

In both instances the work has been removed from the

bargaining unit and is or will be performed by non-bargaining
unit persons.

In my experience, and again I am satisfied that the

relevant cases so hold, the phrases contracting out and farming
out are applied equally and with the same meaning to the transfer
of work to other facilities and non-bargaining unit personnel of
the same employer located elsewhere and to stranger companies.

-5The foregoing answers primary issue #3 and subsidiary
question A.
With regard to subsidiary question B it is my view that the
Company may not be excused from violations of Articles I (b) and
I (c) merely by payment of severance pay under Article XXXVI of
the contract.

I am not persuaded that Article XXXVI was intended

to apply to the permanent closedown of a plant or a portion there
of because the work of that facility was contracted or farmed out
In my view the closing of a plant or a substantial portion thereof, within the meaning of Article XXXVI, would come about as a
result of a discontinuance or sharp reduction in the availability
of work performed by that facility.

I am not persuaded that it

was intended to cover the circumstance where the work remained
available but had been or was to be transferred to non-bargaining
unit personnel.

However assuming arguendo that Article XXXVI is

applicable to the termination of employees due to the permanent
contracting or farming out of work they previously performed, I
am convinced that the terminations involved must still conform
to the requirements of Articles I (b) and I (c) in order for the
Company's liability to be limited only to payment of the severanc
1
allowance. If the contracting or farming out which resulted in
the close of a department or plant or a substantial portion there
of caused terminations in violation of Articles I (b) and I (c),
the Company would be liable for damages arising from the Article
I (b) and I (c) violations and would not be immune from that
liability by the mere payment of the severance allowance.

In other

words, terminations due to the closing of a plant or department
due to contracting out or farming out would require the payment
1. The resulting inconsistency supports my earlier view that
Article XXXVI is inapposite.

-6of severance allowances and also must comply with Articles I (b)
and I (c) to be contractually proper.

Otherwise, in a substan-

tial manner, Articles I (b) and I (c) would be unnecessary, if
not meaningless.
Nor is this changed by Article XXXIV (Management Rights).
The Company's right "to relieve employees from duty because of
lack of work, or other legitimate reasons...." is expressly
"subject to the provisions of this Agreement."

As Articles I

(b) and I (c) are provisions of the Agreement, the Company's
right to relieve employees from duty because the work they normally perform or are capable of performing has been contracted or
farmed out, is subject to the conditions and restrictions of
Articles I (b) and I (c) of the contract.

In short, termination

of employment under Article XXXVI presupposes valid contractual
terminations.

It, and the payment of severance pay thereunder

are not substitutes or cures for employment terminations that
violate other contract provisions.
The foregoing answers subsidiary question B.
We then turn to Articles I (b) and I (c) themselves, and to
the primary stipulated issues nos. 1 and 2.

Based on all the

foregoing, I am satisfied that Articles I (b) and I (c) are
sufficiently clear and unambiguous.

I (b) is essentially a state

ment setting forth the Union's general jurisdiction over "the
making, assembling, erection, dismantling and repairing of machin
ery of all descriptions...."

It contemplates that the work will

be performed by the Company or by an outside contractor, or by
the manufacturer under guarantee.

If the work is performed by

bargaining unit employees there is of course no problem.

By the
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terms of I (b) the latter, work performed under the manufacturer's
guarantee, is not within the Union's jurisdiction and thus not
bargaining unit work.

Hence work in that category is not "con-

tracted" within the meaning of Article I (b).

Also " work con-

tracted to a contractor is not bargaining unit work or within the
Union's jurisdiction if the work requires "special skills not
available within the bargaining unit."

But, work of the covered

type which the bargaining unit has the skills to perform falls
within the Union's jurisdiction and must be deemed bargaining unit
work.
It should be noted that Article I (b) does not set forth
circumstances and conditions under which the Company may contract
out work which falls within the Union's jurisdiction under that
Article.

I do not interpret silence on that question to mean that

the Company may not, under any circumstance, contract out that
work, even where the bargaining unit possesses the skills to
perform it.
Rather the Company's rights and restrictions in that regard
and with regard to all other types of bargaining unit work, is set
forth in Article I (c).

(Indeed the negotiation of I (c) two

years subsequent to the agreement on I (b) may very well have been
for that purpose - namely to set forth specifically the terms and
circumstances under which contracting and farming out would be
allowed or disallowed.) In short, to answer primary issues 1 and
and for logical contract interpretation, Articles I (b) and I (c)
must be read together.
Article I (c) is clear enough.

It is stipulated in the recor

that the word "roster" means a "group of jobs or classifications

-8related by skill and pay" and that "any experience in a job or
jobs within a roster would meet the definition of employment in
(the) rosters" within the meaning of Article I (c).

My inter-

pretation of Article I (c) is that the Company may not farm out
any bargaining unit work if:
1.

appropriate equipment and qualified employees in the bargaining unit are available; or

2.

it would cause a layoff or a reduction in
the normal, regular, straight-time employment of employees in any job classification
within a roster which would normally perform
that work; or

3.

when there are employees with experience in
any of the job classifications within a
roster which would normally do that work who
are either on layoff or not working, a normal,
regular, straight-time work week.

Put conversely, and applied to Articles I (b) and I (c) the
Company may farm out or contract out any bargaining unit work:
1.

so long as there is not appropriate equipment
and/or qualified bargaining unit employees
available; and

2.

so long as it does not cause a layoff or a
reduction in the normal straight-time employment of bargaining unit employees in classifications within rosters which would normally
do that work; and

3.

so long as there are not on layoff or
not working a normal work week, employees
in job classifications within the roster
which would normally do that work.

If none of the foregoing circumstances are present or result,
the Company may farm out or contract bargaining unit work covered
by both Articles I (c) and I (b) of the contract.

And as previous

ly indicated it is immaterial in my view whether the contracting

out or farm out is to a stranger company or to another facility
of Chicago Pneumatic not covered by this collective bargaining
agreement.
This answers primary issues 1 and 2.
As I have viewed Articles I (b) and I (c) as sufficiently
clear and unambiguous, any past practice consistent therewith
is relevant.

Any past practice that is inconsistent would have

no prospective effect on the rights of either the Company or the
Unions to henceforth enforce these clear contract terms.

uric ft, Schmertz
Arbitrator
December 1, 1981

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
APTA District Council 47

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1439 0769 79J

and
City of Philadelphia

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Robin Cook? If not what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held on September 17, 1979, March 4, and
April 9, 1980 at which time Ms. Cook, hereinafter referred to
as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named parties
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
The parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Based on the record before me I am persuaded that on
several occasions the grievant claimed she was sick, used the
sick leave benefits of the contract and absented herself from
her primary employment at the Philadelphia Nursing Home, but was
able to work and did work shifts at a different place of employment (the Stephen Smith Nursing Home) immediately before or
immediately after her scheduled tour of duty from which she
absented herself at the Philadelphia Nursing Home.
I conclude that on those occasions the grievant was not
sick or unable because of illness to work her regular schedule
at the Philadelphia Nursing Home, but rather took the time off
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to be able more conveniently to work at her second job at the
Stephen Smith Nursing Home, and to receive pay from both places
of employment.
I deem this to be a false and improper use of sick
leave, in violation of the contract and civil service law.
Together with the grievant's prior disciplinary record of warnings
and suspensions for other offenses, which were contested by the
Union in this proceeding, but which because they were not grieved
at the time imposed are no longer challengeable herein, the misuse of such time, constitutes grounds for discharge.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Robin Cook was for
just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 28, 1981

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Council 13, American Federation
of State, County and Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO

.
A W A R D

A

and
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

The above named Union represents the bargaining unit
of Correction Officers and Psychiatric Security Aides employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at state correctional and mental institutions. In collective bargaining
between the Union and the Commonwealth for a successor contract to the one due to expire on June 30, 1981 an impasse
was reached on certain issues. In accordance with applicable
statutes those unresolved issues have been submitted to the
Undersigned Panel for resolution by arbitration.
Hearings were held on April 4, 5, 26, May 1 and 2, 1981,
at which time representatives

of both sides appeared and were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Also, at the request
of the parties and accompanied by their representatives, the
Chairman of the Arbitration Panel visited certain correctional
and mental institutions and observed the duties and conditions
of employment of the Correction Officers and Psychiatric
Security Aides employed at those locations.
The Arbitration Panel met in executive session on June
7th, 1981.
Upon full consideration of the entire record, the Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitration Panel, makes the
following AWARD:
1.

By direct collective bargaining the parties
reached agreement on a number of issues.
Those resolved issues and the agreements
thereon are incorporated by reference herein
and shall be included by the parties in the
successor collective bargaining agreement.
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2.

Contract Term
The contract shall be for two (2) years
commencing July 1, 1981 and ending June
30th, 1983.

3.

Wa.g_ej3
The Correction Officers and the Psychiatric
Security Aides shall receive an 8 per cent
across-the-board wage increase effective
July 1, 1981 and an additional 8 per cent
across-the-board wage increase effective
July 1, 1982,
Also the employees shall receive a $200
cash bonus shortly after the commencement
of the successor contract. There shall be
a moratorium on payment by the Commonwealth
of health and welfare plan contributions for
the first six months of the successor contract.

4.

Longevity
Effective July 1, 1981 the first and second
paragraphs of Section 7 of Article 19 of the
expiring contract shall be replaced in the
successor contract by
a. a provision that during the period
July 1, 1981 through June 30, 1983
a wage increase to Step F of the
next higher pay range shall be granted
to an employee who has served ten years
or more as a Correction Officer or
Psychiatric Security Aides; and
b. a provision that during the period
July 1, 1981 through June 30, 1983
a second longevity increment shall
be granted to an emplo3>-ee who has
served nineteen or more years as a
Correction Officer or Psychiatric Security
Aide. However this latter longevity
increment each year shall be equivalent to one-half of the next higher

-3pay range of Step F. Also it shall
be a lump sum cash bonus and shall not
constitute an increase in salary or
wage rate. It shall not be included
in calculations for any benefits for
which a salary or wage rate is utilized.
5.

Shift Differential
Effective July 1, 1981 the shift differential
shall be 35 cents per hour, Other demands of
both parties as regarding the shift differential
are denied.

6.

Meal Feriods
The meal allowance presently referred to in
Article 8 Section 2 of the expiring contract
shall be increased to $6.00 in the successor
contract.
In the successor contract, Article 8 Section
4 shall read:
The Employer agrees to reimburse all
employees in accordance with the appropriate expense regulation for all
meals missed as a result of community
assignments.

7.

Clothing Allowance.
Correction Officers and Psychiatric Security
Aides shall receive a clothing allowance of
$100 a year effective July 1, 1982,

8 . Grievance Procedure^ and__A'rb'i'tr_ation
At the hearing
the Commonwealth withdrew
that part of its demand on this issue relating to an extension of time limits.
The balance of the Commonwealth's demand is
granted and shall be included in the successor
contract.
9.

Sanitary Facilities
The issue is limited to the matter of shower

-4facilities for Psychiatric Security Aides
at Norristown. The Commonwealth shall make
a shower facility available which the
Psychiatric Security Aides may use in private,
at which their personal belongs are secure,
which is adequately heated and which is not
used by residents of the institution.
It is the judgement of the Panel that such a
shower facility, among possibly others, is
available in that portion of the institution
which had been planned for female residents
(but which is not presently so occupied) and
which is now used periodically for group therapy
sessions.
10.

Miscellaneous; ^Provisions
a.

The issue concerning "passing and/or
pouring of medicines at Huntingdon,
Muncy and Philadelphia State involves
only the matter of "passing" medicines,
as there is no evidence that employees
of this bargaining unit are "pouring"
medicines.

As we believe there is no

legal liability of or to an employee who
merely passes medicine to a resident, the
Union's demand that employees be relieved
of this responsibility is denied.

However

the parties shall include in the contract,
or in an exchange of letters, a statement
regarding the non-liability of an employee
who passes medicine. It is noted that under
the law and procedures of the Commonwealth,
employees sued under such circumstances are
defended by the Commonwealth.
b . Upward Mobility 'for' Psych la'trie
Security Aides at Mayview
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The parties shall undertake a joint
study of the job duties and work methods
of the Psychiatric Security Aides at
Mayview to determine if those duties and/
or the particular circumstances under which
they work warrant the establishment of higher
job classifications and/or promotional opportunities .

If the Union and the Commonwealth

disagree, the disagreements may be submitted
for arbitration to the Classification Panel
referred to in Article 28 Section 2 of the
current (and successor) contract, and the
decision of that Panel shall be binding.
c.

The Union's demand for 10 per cent
hazardous duty pay when a shift works
short is denied.

d.

The Union's demand for a mandatory
one-time a year shutdown at Muncy
is denied.

11.

The Union's demand for a "buy-out" of rest
periods for Psychiatric Security Aides, is
denied.
The Panel believes that this is more
appropriately a matter for future collective bargaining.

12.

The Commonwealth's demands with regard to
holidays are denied without prejudice.

13.

The Union's demands with regard to personal
leave days are denied.

14.

The Union's demand with regard to expediting
overtime payments is denied. However the
Panel strongly recommends that in the interest
of sound personnel practices the Commonwealth

-6inquire into the circumstances surrounding delays in paying for overtime work,
and take steps to expedite payment.
15.

The Union's demand for "call time and lay
over" is denied.

16.

The Union's demand regarding survivor's
insurance is denied.

17.

The Commonwealth's demand concerning work
related injuries is denied.

18.

The Union's demand for payment at the higher
rate for work in a higher classification
immediately upon assuming the higher duties,
is denied.

19.

a.

The demands of the Commonwealth with regard to Discharge, Demotion, Suspension
and Discipline are denied.

b.

The demands of the Union with regard to
Discharge, Demotion and Suspension are
denied.

20.

The Commonwealth's demand regarding extension
of the promotion probationary period is denied.

21.

The Commonwealth's demand regarding Peace and
Stability is denied without prejudice to the
respective legal and/or judicial rights of
the parties.

22.

The demand of the Commonwealth regarding its
claimed right to determine when uniforms are
to be worn is denied without prejudice.

23.

The Undersigned Panel retains jurisdiction of
this matter for interpretation and implementation of the foregoing decisions and/or
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to assist the parties,if necessary, in
the preparation of appropriate contract
language covering these decisions and
for the incorporation of these decisions
into the collective bargaining agreement
effective July 1, 1981 through June 30,
1983.

DATED: June 18, 1981
Eric J, Schmertz
Chairman

DATED: June

1981
Gerald W. McEntee
Concurring in Nos.

Dissenting from Nos.

DATED: June

1981
Miles J. Gibbons, Jr.
Concurring in Nos.

Dissenting from Nos.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
Between
Hotel and Restaurant Employees and
Bartenders International Union,
AFL-CIO, Local 76

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Concord Hotel

This case involves the grievances of Carole Higgins, Lloyd Freeman
and George Wilde. Each claim that the Employer improperly deducted allowances for lodging and/or meals on certain days.
A hearing was held at the Concord Hotel on December 22, 1980 at which
time the grievants and representatives of the above named Union and Employer
appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath
was waived.
Specifically, Higgins and Freeman who live off premises claim that
on seven and six days respectively in 1980 when they were sick and not at
work the Employer deducted $3.90 on each of those days for "meals" when because of their illnesses they took no meals at work. Wilde who lives on
premises claims that on three days in 1979 and four days in 1980 on what
otherwise would have been personal leave days and his birthday and on which
he actually worked, both his pay for the personal leave days and birthday
(which by contract are days off) and his pay for the time worked those days
had deductions for lodging and meals. His position is that on those days
when he received double pay (i.e. pay for the contractual day off and for
working) the deductions for meals and lodging should have been made only from
one of those payments, namely from the payment for time worked, but not from
pay for his birthday or personal leave. During the hearing Freeman also made
a similar claim in connection with his birthday in 1980.
It is undisputed that under the law the Employer may deduct from wages
for worked performed, a daily amount for meals and lodging for employees who
live on premises, and for meals for those who live off premises. These are
among the recognized statutory or "legal allowances."
The question in this arbitration is whether on days that an employee
is sick and not at work there should be a deduction for "meals" from his sick
pay benefit for that day, and whether if an employee works on his birthday or

-2personal leave day his leave and birthday pay should be diminished by a meal
and lodging allowance when his pay for the actual day worked is decreased by
those deductions as well.
The Union's case is essentially equitable. It argues that it is unfair to deduct for meals when an employee who lives off premises does not
work because of illness and took no meals on the Employer's premises. And that
it is equally unfair and illogical to deduct twice on the same day for meals
and lodging when an employee works on his birthday or personal leave day.
The Arbitrator is bound to the terms of the contract. If contract
provisions cover the instant circumstances, those provisions prevail, equitable considerations to the contrary not withstanding. Even assuming a
persuasiveness to the Union's equitable arguments, I find specific contract
language that is dispositive of the issue and which supports the Employer's
position herein.
Article XI Sections A and B Employee's Birthday and Employee's
Personal Day read:
Section A. Employee's Birthday. Provided he
qualifies for a one week vacation, an employee shall receive a day off at straight pay on
his birthday. At the Employer's option, the
affected employee may be required to work on
his birthday at his regular rate of pay for
that day and be given another day off at straight
time pay in lieu of his birthday.
Section B. Employee's Personal Day. Provided
he qualifies for a one week vacation, an employee
shall receive a personal day off at straight
time pay on such date as may be mutually agreed
upon between the employee and his supervisor.
The question narrows to what is "straight pay?" Does it mean the
hourly rate times the hours worked with deductions or without deductions?
And if the latter, which deductions.
The answer is found in Schedule A of the contract together with how,
under the contract, the parties handle "straight pay" for purposes of vacation. I am persuaded that the contractual definition of "straight pay" calls
for certain deductions and/or the deduction of allowances, and that "straight
pay" for the personal leave days and birthdays involved in this case is a
days pay at the hourly rate less legal allowances which include the disputed
lodging and/or meal deductions.

If those deductions were not part of "straight pay" what the parties

-3-

negotiated differently for vacation pay would have been unnecessary.

Article

XII (Vacations) expressly limits deductions from vacation pay to federal and
state taxes. I conclude that that limitation was negotiated for vacation pay,
whereas no such limit is placed on "straight pay" for birthday and personal
leave days, to insure that meal and lodging allowances would not be deducted
from vacation pay. As federal and state taxes are routinely deducted from
all pay it follows that an explicit contract provision limiting deductions
to those items must have been included to bar other deductions and to
distinguish "straight pay" for vacations from "straight pay" for other
purposes. For if all "straight pay" was without deductions or only with a
deduction of federal and state taxes, any such language would be superfluous
and meaningless. I do not think the parties negotiated a meaningless sentence.
Clearly the distinction, so far as this case is concerned, is between
"straight pay" for vacations and "straight pay" for personal leave days and
birthdays. The latter two, by the contract terms, are to be paid for at
"straight pay" without any mention of or limitation on deductions or allowances.

Therefore if "straight pay" for vacations is subject only to federal

and state taxes, which are routinely deducted anyway, it follows that "straight
pay" for personal leave days and birthdays must involve other deductions or
allowances as well, and those other allowances must be "legal allowances" including meals and lodging.
In short, the limited pay deductions from vacation pay are explicit
exceptions to what otherwise is "straight pay" for other benefit days.
This is supported by Schedule A. For the various relevant classifications Schedule A provides for a specified hourly pay rate less all legal
allowances. Consequently, "straight pay" for personal leave days and holidays
must be the specified hourly rate times the relevant hours, less state and
federal taxes and the legal allowances for meals and/or lodging.
As for sick pay, Article XVII Section A reads in pertinent part:
An employee....shall be entitled to six (6)
days of sick leave without loss of pay in
his employment or fiscal year, (emphasis added)

To my mind the underscored language means that an employee shall
receive the same amount of pay when he is sick as he would receive if he
worked. Here, had the grievants not been sick they would have been paid for
the day with deductions for meals. Their sick pay for the days in question
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was in the same amounts. Hence I can find no "loss of pay" in what
they received and therefore I find no contract violation.
Based on the foregoing, the pay an employee is entitled to receive
as sick pay, for a birthday and for a personal leave day is what the Employer
accorded each of the grievants in the circumstances presented. That Wilde
worked on his birthday and on personal leave days and Freeman worked on one
birthday, is immaterial. A benefit day and a day worked are two separate
circumstances. It is undisputed that the Employer had the right to deduct
for meals and/or lodging for the time worked^ And since the benefit for the
birthday and personal leave day is confined to "straight time" as defined, I
cannot find contractual fault with the deductions the Employer made from the
payment for those benefits even though two sets of deductions were made on
the same day. In my view the contract provides for the deduction, whether
it be a benefit day or a work day and those deductions obtain to both
independent circumstances even if, by coincidence, both occur in the same
calendar day. And it is to the contract that I must adhere. If these results,
which are reflections of the contract negotiated by the parties are inequitable, a change is for collective bargaining not arbitration.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes
the following AWARD:
The grievances of Carole Higgins, Lloyd Freeman
and George Wilde are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATEDj_ January 20, 1981
STATE OF New York

)
„,
, oo • •

COUNTY OF New York )

On this 20th day of January, 1981, before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Locals Number 420 and 457 of the
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and

The Connecticut Light and Power
Company

In accordance with Article IV of the collective bargaining
agreement effective June 1, 1979 between the above named Union
and Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide a dispute involving the use of gas contractors by
the Company.
Hearings were held in Meriden, Connecticut on January 21
and April 22, 1981 at which time representatives of the Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The parties did not agree upon a precisely worked issue.
Based on the record, I deem the questions for determination to

be:
1.

Are the grievances filed by Local
457 arbitrable in the instant proceeding?

2.

Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement by utilizing contractors to perform work
regularly performed by bargaining
unit employees while members of the
bargaining unit were eligible for
recall and/or had been displaced from
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their regular jobs through the
exercise of bumping rights?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
The Company decided in 1977 to reduce its permanent work
force due to changes in the demand for gas services.

The Company

implemented the layoff procedures of the collective bargaining
agreement for certain gas department employees represented by
Locals 420 and 457 in late 1977; however, the notice provisions
and bumping rights contained in that agreement delayed the
effectuation of the layoffs, and the accompanying displacement
of employees who opted to exercise their contractual bumping
rights, to the period commencing on February 12, 1978.
Later, in July 1979, the Company experienced an increase
in the demand for gas services and began to utilize outside
contractors to perform certain work that the additional demand
generated.

The Company did not recall any of the employees whose

recall rights had not Iapsed0

Local 420 filed grievances concern

ing the Company's use of outside contractors as follows: October
4, 1979 for the Norwalk District; October 29, 1979 for the Shelto
District; January 2, 1980 for the Danbury District; January 2,
1980 for the Torrington District; and January, 1980 for the
Waterbury District.

Local 457 filed grievances as follows:

October 1, 1979 for the Enfield District; November 30, 1979 for
the Bristol District; November 30, 1979 for the Danielson Distric
and October 15, 1979 for the Meriden District. Representatives
of Local 420 and the Company arranged a grievance meeting for
January 3, 1980; Local 457 was represented at the meetingo

The
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grievances were not settled and, as a result, the instant
arbitration was commenced.
Issue 1: The Arbitrability of the Local 457 Grievances
The Company asserts that Local 457 is not a party to this
arbitration.

In support of this claim of non-arbitrability, the

Company relies on the failure of Local 457 to arrange its own
meeting pursuant to Step Three of the grievance procedure and
the failure of Local 457 to communicate its intent to arbitrate
either orally or in writing as did Local 420. (Company Exhibit
2(a)-2(d)0)

The Company also insists

that the Local 457 never

made a demand for arbitration and did not participate in the
selection or designation of the arbitrator as did Local 420.
The Company maintains that Local 457 should have demanded arbitration and then participated in selecting the arbitrator as it
did in a parallel arbitration case involving the use of outside
contractors for the electrical portion of the Company's operation
The Union claims that Local 457 advised the Company at the
Step Three grievance meeting on January 3, 1980 that it intended
to act jointly with Local 420 and that the Company accepted this
arrangement.

Although the demand for arbitration only referred

to Local 420, the Union argues that Local 420 had intended to
encompass the grievances of Local 457.
In my judgment the parties jointly processed the grievances
of Local 420 and Local 457 to arbitration.

It is undisputed that

the parties to the collective bargaining agreement are the Compan|y
and the two Locals.

Local 420 and Local 457 jointly negotiated
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referred to as the UNION . . . . " The agreement repeatedly
utilizes the additional terms "Local concerned" and "Local Union
concerned."

The parties, therefore, knew how to differentiate

between a single Local and both Locals.

But Article IV refers

throughout to the "Union" (i.e. both Locals) but omits any refer
ence to "Local concerned" or Local Union concerned" (i.e. a
single Local).

There is, consequently, a strong presumption tha

both Locals may participate in the same arbitration.
Under the factual circumstances surrounding the processing
of the gas contractor grievances as reflected in the record and
cited above, I find that the Company failed to rebut this presumption.

The joint processing of the grievances at Step Three

coupled with the Company's failure to schedule a Step Three
meeting for Local 457 are probative evidence that the Company
understood that the two Locals would process the grievances on
a joint basis.

The procedure utilized by Local 420 and Local

457 in jointly processing to arbitration the grievances concerning the use of electrical contractors explicitly indicated the
involvement of both Locals (Company Exhibit 3(a)-3(c).)
Furthermore, the introduction by the Company of only one
example of how grievances are processed by the two locals is
insufficient evidence to prove a past practice that supersedes
the thrust of Article IV, which the parties bilaterally negotiat
and the conduct of the parties throughout the processing of the
instant grievances.

In light of all of these circumstances, it

is my finding, that the grievances filed by Local 457 are
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arbitrable in the instant arbitration proceeding.
Issue 2:

The Merits of the Grievance

The Union claims that Article XVI, entitled Contract Work,
prohibits the Company from using outside contractors to perform
bargaining unit work when members of the bargaining unit have
been laid off and/or have been displaced through the exercise of
bumping rights.

As a result, the Union contends that the Company

denied certain employees a continuity of employment in their job
classifications--and, incidentally, permanent promotions--by
using contractors instead of recalling members of the bargaining
unit.

Although the Union recognizes that the Company is not

obligated to recall employees under Article V, Section 4 when
there is a job involving insignificant time, the Union interprets
the agreement to require that the Company recall employees when,
as it alleges is the case herein, there is a significant amount
of work to be performed.
The Company asserts that the work that outside contractors
performed was "sporadic as to location, short-term in duration
and subject to the vicissitudes of weather."

The Company, there-

fore, argues that the use of contractors is not violative of
Article XVI because bargaining unit employees were not deprived
of a "continuity of employment" or "permanent promotional opportunities."

In addition, the Company maintains through Company

Exhibit 7 that in 1963 the Union failed in attempting to secure
a modification of Article XVI that would have further limited the
Company's right to use contractors and that the parties have

-7-

incorporated the 1963 contractual language into the current
agreement.

The Company also argues that the Union's interpreta-

tion of the agreement would cause chaos by leading to instabilit}
in the work force due to constant recalls and layoffs.

Finally,

the Company insists that Article II, entitled the Functions of
Management, permits the Company to determine the number of employees that are necessary for performing its daily operations
and that the Company exercised this contractual right by setting
its base load requirement and, thereafter, by utilizing contractors .
Article XVI provides:
Work regularly performed by employees
covered by this Agreement will not be
contracted out if it would result in
loss of continuity of employment or
opportunities for permanent promotions
to job classifications covered by this
Agreement.
Article XVI is quite specific.

The Company's right to use

contractors is proscribed only if the use of contractors causes
a "loss of continuity of employment or opportunities for permanent promotions . . . . " (emphasis added.)

The critical contract

language does not refer to employees on layoff or even those who
bumped downward as a result of an earlier layoff.

Had the parties

!
intended to prevent the use of contractors while qualified employejes
were on layoff, the prohibition, which was well within their contemplation, could have and should have been explicit.

It is not

under this language, and the same is true for employees, albeit
still working, who had to bump downward to avoid an earlier layofjf.

-8Therefore, under the instant facts and particularly in view of
the less than permanent nature of the work involved (as referred
to later), the phrase "continuity of employment" must apply to
those employees actively at work at the time contractors were
used.

In other words, contractors may not be used if it causes

a layoff or downgrade of employees then at work. Manifestly,
employees then on layoff as a result of an earlier diminution
of work not related to the use of contractors have no "continuity
of employment" because they are not actively at work and their
layoffs are not caused by use of the contractors.

Hence the use

of contractors did not affect them within the meaning of the
controlling contract

language.

Also the record is clear that, to the extent that the
Company retained outside contractors to perform bargaining unit
work, such work which was sporadic in scheduling could only be
performed during above-freezing weather which, as a rule, was
the late March to November time period.

The seasonal and irreg-

ular nature of such work meant that continuity of employment and
promotions would not be reduced for members of the bargaining
unit by using outside contractors because there would be no
demand for such employees or "continuity
the months of December to March.
was involved.

of employment" between

And no "permanent!1 employment

A planned, significant, interruption in employment

is contrary to the clear meaning of "continuous" and "permanent."
As the parties have negotiated successive collective bargain
ing agreements since 1963 that include this identical language,
the Company is not contractually required in my judgment to

-9absorb the financial burden of recalling members of the bargaining unit who would be unable to perform their jobs and therefore
again subject to layoff during an extended period of time such
as the winter months.

I recognize the possible inequitifes .60

employees on layoff, but a modification of this contract provision remains a matter for collective bargaining rather than
for arbitration.

I therefore find, that, under the particular

circumstances of this case, the Company did not violate the
collective bargaining agreement by utilizing contractors to perform work regularly performed by bargaining unit employees while
members of the bargaining unit were eligible for recall and/or
had been displaced from their regular jobs through the exercise
of bumping rights.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

The grievances filed by Local 457
are arbitrable in the instant proceeding.

2.

The Company did not violate the
collective bargaining agreement
by utilizing contractors to perform work regularly performed by
bargaining unit employees while
members of the bargaining unit were
eligible for recall and/or had been
displaced from their regular jobs
through the exercise of bumping
rights.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: October 5, 1981
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this fifth day of October, 1981 before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

c
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

in the Matter of the Arbitration between
C. W. Post Collegial Federation
and
C. W. Post Center, Long Island University

CASE N U M B E R : 1730-0045-79

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
iHIn UNDERSIGNED

accordance with the

arbitration

ARBITRATOR^ ), h a v i n g been designated in
agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated

September 1
1977
:11K' ' lav ' n g been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

The Union's grievance dated October 25, 1978 is denied. The
Memorandum of Understanding dated November 16, 1978 did not
substantively change the terms and meaning of Article XIX of
the contract. The University did not err in its work load
assignments or released time credits to those faculty members
who grieved and/or testified at the hearing. The grievances
of said employees are denied.

<" ?
Arbitrator's signature (dated)

STATE or New York
COUNTY OF New York
On t h i s f i r s t
came and appeared

day of
Eric J.

June

.1981 , before me personally

SchmertZ

to me known and known to me to be the individual(s) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged lo me that he exeeuted the same.
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CASE NUMBER:

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
AH
HE

UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR(S), having been designated in
accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
•-^^/^^-i^-'^\
ftf~? y •*&
and havin8 been duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

sworn and

having duly

Artrator'ssignature (dated)

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this

ss.
day of

,19

, before me personally

came and appeared
to me known and known to me to be the individual(s) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FORM L14-AAA-24M-9-78

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1739 0095 81

Deer Park Teachers Association
and
Deer Park Union Free School District

The stipulated issue is:
Did the District violate Article V
Section 1 of the collective bargaining agreement when it inserted certain memoranda from the Building
Principal into the files of J. Gamble,
P. Osborne, J. Cynar, P. Donaldson and
J. Mancini? If so what shall be the
remedy ?
A hearing was held at the offices of the District on
October 22, 1981 at which time representatives of the above
Association and District appeared. All concerned were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses„

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

At the hearing the Arbitrator ruled the grievance to be
arbitrable.
The pertinent part of Article V Section 1 reads:
ARTICLE V
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Section 1 - Official Professional File
Upon the request of the teacher, on reasonable
notice, he shall be permitted after school
hours to examine his own Deer Park School
System Official Professional File maintained
in the Division of Personnel Such examination
shall be limited to ratings, observations; and
evaluations made by supervisory personnel concerning the teacher's service in the Deer Park

-2School System. No such materials shall
be placed in his file unless the teacher
has an opportunity to read it. The teacher
shall acknowledge that he has read such
materials by signing the copy to be filed,
but such signature shall not be deemed to
constitute agreement by the teacher with
its content. Refusal of the teacher to
sign will be noted by the appropriate
representative of the District. The teacher
shall have the right to answer in writing
any material filed and his answer shall be
inserted in his file. The official school
Evaluation Form must be used for all
professional file insertions. Observations
may be made for the period between sign-in
and sign-out time. The annual evaluation
shall be related to individual evaluations
made during the school year. All official
observations must be written and offered to
the teacher for signing within seven (7)
working days. The teacher when signing the
observation will also write in the date on
which he signed the observation.
The Association contends that the memoranda placed in the
files of the employees named in the stipulated issue (hereinafter
referred to as the "grievants") contained factual inaccuracies,
were substantively unjustified and violated that portion of the
forgoing contract clause requiring that the teachers be afforded
an opportunity to read any such memoranda and to sign the copy to
be filed before the memoranda is placed in the personnel files.
The District asserts that Article V Section 1 is inapplicab le
because the disputed memoranda were not evaluations or observations within the meaning of Article V Section 1 and hence the
procedural requirements of that Section do not obtain.

It is the

District's position that the disputed documents, though written
on Teacher Observation forms were recordings of routine personnel
action taken by the Building Principal and, pursuant to the

-3arbitration decision of Arbitrator Stanley L. Aiges, may be
recorded on Teacher Observation forms without being "observations
or evaluations" within the meaning of Article V Section 1 of the
contract and may be placed in an employee's personnel file.
Additionally the District claims that the documents are substantively accurate and justified.
I need not determine whether the documents are observations or evaluations within the meaning of Article V Section 1
of the contract or simply memoranda.

Nor need I determine whethe

they are substantively accurate or otherwise justified.

Instead

this issue is determined on the procedural requirements of Articl
V Section 1.
By its own action the District has acknowledged that
whether the documents are official observations and evaluations
or only memoranda, the requirements of Article V Sectionl that
a teacher be given an opportunity to read it and to sign a copy
before it is filed in his or her personnel file, must be followed
The Building Principal testified that with regard to these disputed documents, he was instructed by the Assistant Superintenden
of the District, after a single copy of the document was transmitted to each grievant respectively (in all or most cases by
placing it in his or her school mailbox) and after seven days had
elapsed from the date of the memoranda, and after a copy was
placed in each grievant's personnel file, to afford each grievant
an opportunity to sign a copy thereof.

This action by the

Assistant Superintendent refutes the District's claim in this

-4arbitration that the procedures of Article V Section 1 do not
apply to these documents, whether they be memoranda, observations
or evaluations.
question.

And the Aiges decision does not deal with that

The instructions of the Assistant Superintendent to the

Building Principal demonstrates that the District believed that
the grievants were entitled to see and sign the documents before
they were placed in their respective personnel files.

I construe

the instructions of the Assistant Superintendent to mean that he
was advising the Building Principal to "cure" the latter's procedural defect by giving the grievants a chance to sign the
documents, which Article V Section 1 requires be done before
any such documents are placed in the personnel files and within
the prescribed seven days.

However this effort to cure the pro-

cedural defect came too late.

The documents had already been

placed in the grievants1 personnel files, and more than seven
days had elapsed from the dates of the memoranda.
In short, by its own action the District considered the
disputed memoranda to be subject to the procedural requirements
of Article V Section 1 of the contract; those procedural requirements werft:,:not followed; and hence the disputed documents were no
properly placed in the grievants' personnel files.
The Association's requested remedy that the documents be
expunged from the grievants' personnel files and destroyed, is
granted.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:

-5The District violated Article V Section
1 of the collective bargaining agreement
when it inserted certain memoranda from
the Building Principal into the files of
J. Gamble, P. Osborne, J. Cynar, P.
Donaldson and J. Mancini. The memoranda
shall be expunged from the files and
destroyed.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 11, 1981
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this llth day of November, 1981 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the forgoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Dowling College, Chapter of NYSUT

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 1730 0054 81

and
Dowling College

The stipulated issue is:
Is there a violation of Article III
B.l.b Section 3.41 of the contract
by the President naming himself to,
and serving on the Long Range Planning
and Development Committee? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the College on August 26, 1981 at
which time representatives of the above named parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
The Union claims that the contract section set forth in the
stipulated issue bars the President of the College from naming
himself to and from serving on the Committee in question.

That

section reads in pertinent part:
The President of the College....may sit
in all meetings of the Faculty-Administrative
Senate with all rights and privileges of
the members save that of vote and committee
membership....
The Union argues that the Long Range Planning and Development
Committee is a committee from which the President is barred as
to membership and vote because that Committee regularly
to the Faculty-Administrative Senate.

reports

-2The College asserts that the forgoing contract provision
is not applicable to the Long Range Planning and Development
Committee because that Committee is not a committee of the
Faculty-Administrative Senate but rather a Standing Committee
referred to under that heading, and found elsewhere in an entirely
different and separate section of the contract, namely Section
3.73.

Therefore, the College argues, the prohibition of Section

3.41 applies to ad hoc committees established by the FacultyAdministrative Senate, but, because the prohibition is not found
in or under the contract section entitled The Standing Committees,
it does not apply to the Long Range Planning and Development
Committee which is specifically listed as one of the Standing
Committees.
It is generally well settled, and not challenged by the
Union herein, that absent a specific restriction or limitation,
an official with the power to appoint may exercise that power
by appointing himself.

The Union's case is simply that the

contract does contain an explicit restriction and limitation on
the President's right to appoint himself and to exercise the
right to vote, and that that restriction applies to the Committee
in question.
I find the critical contract language and provisions to be
ambiguous.

Either argument advanced respectively by the Union and

the College makes sense.

It is acknowledged that the Long Range

Planning and Development Committee regularly reports to the
Faculty-Administrative Senate.

As such, though that Committee

-3is contractually defined as a "Standing Committee," it could
also qualify as a "committee" within the meaning of Section 3.41
and subject thereby to the proscription on the President's membership and right to vote.

Also Section 3.41 might well be an

expression of general intent.

That is to say that by specifically

excluding the President from committee membership and the right
to vote, the parties intended to express a reservation about such
service by the President and such right to vote on any committee
referred to in the contract; that it was unnecessary to express
the prohibition at each and every location in the contract
relating to committees.
On the other hand the prohibition is found only under the
contract section dealing with the Faculty-Administrative Senate.
It is acknowledged that the Senate has the power and does, from
time to time, establish various ad hoc committees.

The specific

prohibition of Section 3.41 is not found in paragraph C of
Article III under the various regulations dealing with Standing
Committees, of which the Long Range Planning and Development
Committee is one.

As a matter of traditional contract inter-

pretation it is therefore logical to conclude that the prohibition
is limited to the Section where it is found, i.e. to committees
established under the Faculty-Administrative Senate but not to
Standing Committees referred to elsewhere in the contract, even
if those standing committees make reports to the Senate.
Where the contract is unclear or ambiguous the traditional
approach to resolve the ambiguity is to look to past practice if

-4evidence of practice is available and probative.
case it is not.

In the instant

The College pointed to one instance in which

the Vice President for Academic Affairs and Dean of Faculty
appointed himself to serve on the Long Range Planning and
Development Committee in accordance with his contractual right
to "appoint an administrator," and a memorandum from the Chairperson of the Long Range Planning and Development Committee (Dr.
Joan Boyle) stating that she was "pleased" by the President's
appointment of himself to that Committee. These instances do not
constitute a controlling past practice.

The first did not involve

the President and the second was not an authoritative approval
by the Union or by a Union representative.

Therefore the ambiguit

is neither clarified nor resolved one way or the other by any past
practice.
The state of the record remains one of ambiguity.

As such

the Union has not met its burden of proving that a limitation
found in Paragraph B of Article III is applicable to Paragraph C
of that Article.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
There is no violation of Article III B.l.b.
Section 3.41 of the contract by the President
naming himself to and serving on the Long
Range Planning and Development Committee.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: October 20, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) '
On this 20th day of October, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the forgoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Capitol City Lodge No. 354,
Affiliated with District 91,
International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0430 80

and
Dunham-Bush, Inc.

In accordance with Article 15 of the collective bargaining
agreement dated October 29, 1979 between the above, named Union
and Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by refusing to upgrade Oscar Downer and Joe Welch from
Refrigerator Mechanic, Labor Grade 9, to
Refrigerator Mechanic A, Labor Grade 10?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Hartford, Connecticut on March 2, 1981
at which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
was taken.

The Arbitrator's Oath

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

On April 23, 1980 the Union filed grievances 80-36 through
80-42 on behalf of a number of employees in Department 32 who
claimed that the Company had misclassified them as Refrigerator
Mechanics, Class B, Labor Grade 9, rather than as Refrigerator
Mechanics, Class A, Labor Grade 10.

The parties agreed that

Grievance 80-40, filed on behalf of Oscar H. Downer, and Grievance
80-41, filed on behalf of Joe Welch, would be resolved by following
the option recommended by Assistant General Manager William N.
Munro and recited as follows in the minutes of the Dunham-Bush
Union and Management Meeting on June 4, 1980 (Company Exhibit 3,
page 3):
Since it is Management's opinion that
these employees do not possess the skills
to become Grade 10, it was recommended
that the Foremen would assign each Grade
9 employee to work with a Grade 10 employee
over the next three months to help improve
their skills. At the end of the three month
cycle each of the Grade 9 employees would
again be reviewed to see if they were promotable to Grade 10.
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On September 23, 1980 the parties held a Third Step Grievance
Meeting at which time the Company indicated that the grievants
would not be promoted.

The minutes of that meeting (Company

Exhibit 4) reflect that: " Management has completed a review of
these two employees and still feels that they should not be promoted to Grade 10." On October 9, 1980 Downer and Welch filed
Grievance 80-71 that is the subject of the instant arbitration.
The grievance claims that the grievants are currently misclassified. The Union contends that the duties of Refrigerator
Mechanic B and Refrigerator Mechanic A are, in essence, indistinguishable or, in the alternative, that the

grievants are perform-

ing the duties of Refrigerator Mechanic A; are qualified to do so;
and therefore should be upgraded.

The Company asserts that the

job duties are different; that the grievants are unable to perfo
the job of Refrigerator Mechanic A; that Management is under no
duty to promote the grievants even if they were qualified to perform the Refrigerator Mechanic A job; and that the grievants,
therefore, should not be promoted.
Although this case originated as a misclassification dispute, the grievance evolved into a promotion dispute.

The

stipulated issue is framed in terms of a refusal to upgrade the
grievants. I find that the June 4, 1980 option—bilaterally
agreed to by the parties--shifted the grievance to that of a
promotion dispute.

The use of the word "promotable" in Option 3

when coupled with the language contained in Option 1 that the
individuals "would immediately be brought up to Grade 10" and in
Option 2 that the Grade 9's "would be raised to Grade 10" is
determinative. Thus, I conclude that the parties had agreed that
the grievants would be promoted if they were found to "possess
the skills to become Grade 10."
It is well settled that an employer's judgement

concerning

the abilities and qualifications of employees for a promotion
should not be disturbed unless found to be arbitrary, capricious,
or discriminatory. In the instant case there is persuasive
evidence in the record that supports a finding of arbitrariness.
Foreman, Gary Henderson, who was responsible for determining
whether to promote the grievants after the three month review
period had ended, testified that he did not contact employee
Thompson even though the Company had assigned Downer to work with
him during the three month period.

If the purpose of the three

month period was to afford the grievants an opportunity to

-3demonstrate their ability to perform as Refrigerator Mechanics A,
there can be no reasonable explanation for the foreman to have
neglected consulting with Thompson. As a result, Henderson
judged the worthiness of the grievant for promotion without any
input from the key person involved in the review process.
consider this arbitrary.

I

Second, Henderson testified at length about the need for
five years of experience in Department 32 as a Refrigerator Mechanic B before an employee could be promoted to a Refrigerator
Mechanic A.

Although the parties ultimately stipulated at the

hearing that five years of such experience was not an absolute
requirement, it is clear that the Company relied on that requirement. This predisposition, evidenced by the Company's initial
explanation at the hearing that it deemed five years experience
to be a threshold qualification, foreclosed either grievant from
receiving an objective appraisal because it was a chronological
impossibility for either to have achieved five years of experience
in Department 32 by September 1980.

Accordingly, the outcome of

the three month period of review was predetermined from the outset by the Company, and that was arbitrary, if not willfully misleading .
Third, the bilaterally agreed to three month period of
review contemplated a three month period of time for the employees
to "improve their skills." The evidence indicates that the grievants were on vacation during the time frame that the Company
considered to be three months. This reduced what should have been
approximately 12 weeks to only 10 weeks of actual time.

Further-

more, Union Exhibit 1, which the Company did not rebut, indicates
that by assignment, the grievants worked together for three days
during the week of August 18, for five days during the week of
August 25, for five days during the week of September 2, and for
three days during the week of September 8.

This necessitates sub-

tracting 16 additional days from the 10 weeks that remained of the
3 month period of review.

Thus the bilaterally agreed to 12 week

period of review ended up as only a 7 week period. Under these
circumstances I must conclude that the Company acted arbitrarily
by failing to accord the grievants a reasonable and agreed to
period of time, namely 12 weeks to improve their skills, if necessary, to the level the Company asserted was required.
Having found that the Company acted arbitrary in its failure
to carry out and comply with the stipulated arrangement between

-4it and the Union, the appropriate remedy in my judgement is to
upgrade the grievants to the job classification Refrigerator
Mechanic A, effective September 23, 1980, the date of the
Company's improper decision, and make them whole for lost wages
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heards the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The Company violated the collective
bargaining agreement by refusing to
upgrade Oscar Downer and Joe Welch
from Refrigerator Mechanic B, Labor
Grade 9, to Refrigerator Mechanic A,
Labor Grade 10. The Company shall
upgrade them retroactively to September
23, 1980 and shall make them whole for
lost wages.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 19, 1981
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)

:

On this 19th day of May, 1981 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Hospital Professionals and Allied
Employees of New Jersey

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #80K/11517

and
Englewood Hospital Association

The stipulated issue is:
Has the Employer violated the collective
bargaining agreement (1978-1980) by reducing Joan Powell's hourly rate of pay
to $6.92 per hour in connection with her
transfer to PPT 2 classification? Is there
to be a declaration of rights for those
employees similarly situated in the grievance?
If so, what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held in Tenafly, New Jersey on June 29, 1981
at which time representatives of the above named Union and Employer
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitra-

tor's Oath was waived.
The Employer makes a distinction in wages between two groups
of permanent part-time (PPT) employees.

In doing so it relies on

Section 4.03 of the contract which defines two types of permanent
part-time employees, respectively PPT #1 and PPT #2.

For those

classified as PPT #1 the Employer pays the PPT hourly rate set
forth in Schedule A page 42 of the collective bargaining agreement.
For those classified as PPT #2 the Employer pays the lesser per
diem wage rate of that same Schedule A.

In the instant case the

grievant upon her transfer from a full-time classification to that
of the PPT #2 classification was paid the per diem rate of $6.92
an hour.

It is the Union's contention that she should have been

-2paid the PPT rate of $7.97 an hour under the schedule effective
September 1, 1979.
I find the Union's case meritorious.

Schedule A provides

for a rate of pay for PPT employees and makes no

distinction be-

tween those classified as PPT fl and those classified as PPT #2.
Though Section 4.03 divides the PPT classification into two types,
I conclude that that Section merely defines each job and does not
set up nor is it designed to determine the wage rate for either
or both types of PPT employees. Rather, the wage question is
determined by Schedule A.

Had the parties intended that PPT #1

and PPT #2 employees be paid differently, they would and should
have delineated that distinction in the wage scale by providing
for different hourly rates for each of the two PPT classified
employees.

Alternatively the parties would and should have in-

cluded the PPT #2 employee within the per diem compensation column.
That neither was done, particularly in view of the fact that the
parties contractually were aware of the two types of PPT employees,
as provided in Section 4.03,

leads me to conclude that though two

types of PPT employees are defined and employed, the parties did
not intend that they be paid differently.
The "practice" cited and relied upon by the Employer is not
persuasive.

Either the cases are factually different from the

instant dispute, or the examples cited post-dated the instant
grievance and hence lack precedential value.
Accordingly the Employer erred when it paid the grievant in
the PPT #2 classification an hourly rate less than the PPT rate
set forth in Schedule A for the period of time involved.
grievant's rate shall be increased with an appropriate
adjustment.

The

retroactive
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above parties
makes the following AWARD:
The Employer violated the collective bargaining agreement (1978-1980) by reducing Joan
Powell's hourly rate of pay to $6.92 per hour
in connection with her transfer to PPT #2
classification. Her pay shall be increased
to the PPT hourly rate set forth in Schedule
A with a retroactive adjustment for the period
involved.
This decision is limited to the grievance of
Joan Powell. Its applicability to other employees similarly situated is a matter for the
parties to jointly determine and/or for other
arbitral proceedings and determinations in
which the question of other employees similarly
situated is at issue.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 5, 1981
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) " '
On this fifth day of August, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE,, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Frito-Lay, Inc.
and

Case #80K/17095
#80K/14519

Local 802, IBT

The Employer, Frito-Lay, Inc., and the Union, Local 802, IBT, are
parties to a collective bargaining agreement covering the period which is
the subject of these two proceedings. The grievants are John T. Crawford
and Ronald Indelicato, employees of Frito-Lay who were discharged in
February and April, 1980, respectively. Each grieved his discharge. Hearings were held on August 20, 1980, with respect to Mr. Crawford and on
September 18 and October 13, 1980, with respect to Mr. Indelicato. Witnesses
were heard, documents were received in evidence and the Employer submitted
briefs in each case. The Union chose to rely on oral presentations at the
end of each proceeding. Upon receipt of the stenographic record and the
briefs, the hearings were declared closed on December 15, 1980. Because of
the common questions involved, it was agreed that the arbitrator would consider the disposition of the two grievances contemporaneously. Of course,
each of the grievances was considered separately on its own merits. This
decision and opinion covers both grievances, each presenting the stipulated
issue of whether there was just cause for the discharge of the grievants.
In each case, Frito-Lay claims there was just cause, for discharge
because the grievants did not perform competently his duties related to
maintaining proper records and rendering accurate accounts to Frito-Lay.
The Employer does not assert that discharge was based on claims of dishonest
conduct on the part of the discharged employees.
The evidence on behalf of the Employer was substantially the same in
each case. In fact, substantial parts of the minutes of the Crawford hearing were stipulated in evidence in the Indelicato hearing.
The employee's position in each case was also substantially the same.
However, .Mr. Indelicato presented one major question not presented in the
Crawford hearing. Mr. Crawford had a pending claim against Frito-Lay which,
in substance, asserted that his discharge was the product of racial

-2discrimination on the part of Frito-Lay. This claim is not before me in
this proceeding. Mr. Indelicate, who is white, alleged that his discharge
was in whole or in part motivated by Frito-Lay's desire to provide credibility to its claim that Mr. Crawford's discharge was not racially motivated.
Mr. Indelicate's contention is before me in this proceeding. But by virtue
of my disposition of the other issues presented, it is unnecessary to deal
with Mr. Indelicate's claim in this regard.
The Employer has the burden of establishing by evidence that each of
the discharges was for just cause. I turn now to the evidence presented in
support of the claim that discharge was justified because of the failure of
Mr. Crawford and Mr. Indelicate to perform their duties of record-keeping
and accounting competently. In substance, the evidence consists of a
description of the duties of each employee, the production of periodic statements by the Employer showing the state of accounts between Frito-Lay and
the employee and conclusions drawn from the periodic statement of accounts.
Mr. Crawford and Mr. Indelicate, were route salesmen employed in
Frito-Lay's Bronx depot. Route salesmen deliver goods to retail customers
and collect payments in the form of cash, checks and authorized credit
receipts. Each day a route salesman is required to render a daily account
of the transactions for the day. The records of the transactions include:
(1) order invoices which reflected inventory transactions between the salesman and Frito-Lay; (2) sales tickets which reflected transactions with the
customers on the route; and (3) a daily report which is a summary of the
day's transactions. A usual route out of the Bronx depot would involve 8 to
10 customers. At the end of each day, a route salesman turns in his daily
report together with the receipts for the day. If receipts were in cash, he
obtained a money order for the amount and gave that to the Company with his
daily report and checks and authorized credit receipts, if any.
Based on these reports, as well as information not available to or
supplied by the salesmen (e.g., checks uncollected for insufficient funds),
the Company's central accounting system located in Dallas would cause to be
issued computer printouts (route settlement reports) reflecting, inter alia,
each salesman's account.) These reports were issued at the end of each four
week period, i.e., 13 per year. The computer-produced statements would reflect
shortages or overages in the salesman's account or that it was in balance.
In the event of a shortage which the salesman did not explain satisfactorily,
he is required to pay the Company the amount of the shortage within the first

-3five days of the next accounting period. Overages are credited or paid to
the employee.
Computer reported imbalances in a salesman's account are not uncommon.
Indeed, zero balances at the end of a four week period are more unusual than
overages or shortages and shortages more usual than overages. There are many
explanations for shortages that are benign rather than attributable to dishonesty. A shortage does not mean that Frito-Lay is out-of-pocket the amount
in sjuestioi> because Company policy has been that unless the employee can explain the shortage reflected in the periodic statement so as to reduce or
eliminate it he must and does pay the balance shown to be due.
In or about April, 1979, the Company determined that the frequent
appearances of shortages and overages in the accounts presented a serious
problem. In addition to reflecting the difficulties in the efficacy of its
accounting system, the shortage problem meant that the Company was losing
the value of the cost of money for the period, however short, during which
money remained due from its employees. Frito-Lay received much of its payments
in cash. Sixty percent of the 5 million dollar annual sales in the northeast
region represented cash sales. Nationally, 1/3 of its 1.5 billion dollars in
annual sales was in cash. Unrepaid shortages amounted to $277,000 in 1979,
nationally. However, this figure includes amounts written off due to thefts
from driver's trucks; the reasons for the remaining amount of shortages are
not known.* In the Bronx depot, the amount of shortages written off in 1979
for all reasons was $7,700.
The dimensions of these figures caused the Company to institute a
new policy in or about April, 1979. At that time, the Company announced a
policy applicable throughout the nation. In substance, the Company declared
that frequent overages or shortages in excess of $50 per four week accounting
period would result in discipline and ultimately discharge. Even with respect
to an amount of $50 or less, the employee would be responsible for reimbursing the Company for shortages. The Company also believed it had a special
problem with respect to the Bronx depot where Crawford and Indelicate were

*It is common for employees who have been discharged to fail to pay the
shortages.

-4employed. In the Bronx depot, the Company applied the $50 standard.*
It is undisputed that the Company's computer printout statement reflected shortages by the grievants in excess of $50 for most of the periods
between April, 1979 and the moment when each was discharged. It is also undisputed that each grievant reimbured the Company for the net amount of the
asserted shortages (i.e., after deductions for break-ins, etc.).** Thus,
the only question is whether the Company has sustained its burden of proving
it had just cause to discharge them because of a failure to accurately account
to Frito-Lay under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Company's position and the nature of the proof upon which it
relies is best exemplified by the testimony of Mr. Alan R. Spachman who was
responsible for Frito-Lay's employment relations and labor relations
activities in the Northeast region where the Bronx facility is located.
He described the Company's problems and concerns with the shortages reflected
in the computer generated four week route settlement reports by the Company's
Dallas central account facility. He also described the prescribed procedures
to be followed by route salesmen, a typical day for a salesman in the Bronx
facility and the special concerns with the Bronx facility. Company policy
concerning the establishment of the $50 rule and disciplinary policy were
addressed by his testimony.
He conceded that the Company could not explain the reason for any
particular shortages and, indeed, during the hearings the Company did not
attempt to do so. The following testimony of Spachman at the Crawford hearing is a fair summary of the Company's position:
Q. In fact, may of the explanations for shortages have
to do with causes located with the Company facility,
the paper processing, the not giving credit or proper
credit for sales or that kind of thing?
A. (Spachman) Not reconciled shortages, no, that is not
correct.
*The Elmsford facility, subject to the same collective bargaining agreement
as the Bronx facility, was subject to a $100 rule. The Company presented
testimony that Elmsford and the Bronx were managed independently of one another
and that Elmsford had had a $100 rule for a considerable period before the
Company announced its $50 rule. Further, the problems at Elmsford were not
as acute as at the Bronx facility.
**The Company and Indelicate are in dispute about the amount due, if any,
attributable to Indelicate's last period. The dispute relates to whether or
not Indelicate was credited with the turnover of some inventory to another
driver. In any event, the Company does not rely on this period as a basis
for just cause.

-5Q. I don't know what you mean by that.
A. Well, at the end of the period, the salesman gets
the route settlement report.
Q. Yes.
A. It is in an unreconciled form. Only he has all the
paper work available to insure that it is correct.
He checks that against his own records and we do set
up a procedure and have given instructions on how that check
should be made on a period basis to be sure that he has
gotten all the credits that he has coming, that he has
been charged with all the charges that he should have
been charged for; no more, no less. That is what we
call a reconciled period.
At the end of that period, if there is a missing piece
of paper that is brought to the Company's attention,
the balance is adjusted.
After that reconciliation, if a shortage occurs, then
it is not an error of Frito-Lay or a paper work problem
or a system problem.
Q. So far as the reconciliation process reveals, but I am
sure you will concede that you have not ironed out every
darn bug in that system to be able to trace every piece
of paper, so there are times when, reconciliation efforts
aside, you don't know the reason for the shortage; is that
correct?
A. The Company may not know, but the salesman has all the
paper and assistance available to him.
Q. You can
you the
for the
is that

only speak for the Company. That is why I ask
questions. The Company doesn't know the reason
shortage at times even after the reconciliation;
correct?

A. Yes.
Q. That is why you say to the driver, to the salesman, "You
want us to make you whole"?
A. Yes.
Q. You figure he must know, if you don't know?
A. Yes.
Q. You make him responsible?
A.

Yes.

Q. His job depends on it?
A. Yes.

-6Q.

You ask him at the end of the period and at the
end of the reconciliation to pay back the Company
for whatever shortage still exists without explanation?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

Whether the explanation — in fact, even if no one knows
it has to do with the Company errors or salesman errors,
the salesman pays it; is that right?

A.

The salesman has the only complete record of every
transaction.

Q. We have been through that.
A.

That there could be no Company error that he could not
determine through the reconciliation process. There
should be no reason for a Company error to create a shortage that he has to pay.

Q.

So your testimony is that with a Company that generated.
$1.5 billion in 1979, your reconciliation process is such
that every Company error ever made is caught at the end
of every period so that whatever is left must be the
driver error?

A. No, that is not what I said.
Q.

Okay.

Let me see if we can get at it this way.

Even if after the reconciliation process a shortage
occurs that no one is able to explain, the driver is
responsible, the salesman must pay the Company; is that
correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Even if he doesn't know the reason and even if the
Company doesn't know the reason, he is the one that
has to pay; is that correct?

A.

That is correct, but I can't agree there would be a
situation that existed that he would not be able to
know the reason for it.

THE ARBITRATOR:
this point.

I just want to be clear on something at

You said settlement reports, the vast majority of them
show some slight shortage?
THE WITNESS:

Yes.

THE ARBITRATOR:
process?
THE WITNESS:
out.

What remains after the reconciliation

The balances in most cases are nearly zeroed

-7THE ARBITRATOR: So in most cases there is reconciliation?
THE WITNESS: Oh, yes.
THE ARBITRATOR: The vast majority of route settlement
reports would show a shortage?
THE WITNESS: Would show some deviation and more than half
are shortages.
THE ARBITRATOR: That most of those or virtually all of those
are reconciled?
THE WITNESS: In one form or another. By "reconciled," I
mean the salesman knows where the shortage is, if he
is responsible for it.
THE ARBITRATOR: I don't mean reconciliation where the salesman just comes up with the money. I don't consider that
reconciliation. By "reconciliation," I mean that the
shortages are accounted for, paperwork, mistakes, something
like that.
THE WITNESS: No, I wouldn't say that is the case then. I
would say that even after reconciliation, and there aren't
that many that require further action after the computerized
reports are generated.
THE ARBITRATOR: They reconcile themselves?
THE WITNESS: That is right. They are reasonably accurate.
THE ARBITRATOR: I am looking for a percentage which those
on the raw basis shows a shortage. After reconciliation
what percentage of the total number of reports that you
are responsible for still show an unreconciled and unexplained shortage after reconciliation, but before payment by the driver of the balance due?
THE WITNESS: I would have to give you a guess on that. I
couldn't give you an answer.
THE ARBITRATOR:

Is it a lot or a little?

THE WITNESS: More than half. For example, when I pulled
the route for the month, my seven dollar balance was
unreconcilable. I know where it went. I had an explanation in my mind for that shortage, but it was not reconcilable.
THE ARBITRATOR: You could not officially reconcile it?
THE WITNESS: That is right. That is the usual situation.
THE ARBITRATOR:

Thank you.

BY MR. HARTZ:

Q. The only point that I want to get on the record, and I

-8think you will agree with me, is that at that
point, regardless of whether the driver knows
about it or not, and you think he does, but
regardless or whether he does, regardless whether
it is a Company error or undiscovered, the salesman
pays the Company?
A. Yes.
Q. The salesman must pay?
A. Yes.
Q. The Company is made whole ultimately?
A. Ultimately, not on a daily basis.
Q. On a period basis? On an accounting period
basis, 13 times a year?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, the Company is very concerned about reducing shortages, is it not?

A. Yes.
The foregoing is descriptive of how the Employer sought to sustain
its burden of proving that imbalances were due to the grievant's fault. I
find the burden has not been met.
The Employer's position in effect is that because the original paperwork was performed by the employee and he retained copies, the employee is
in the better position to mount a factual challenge to the accuracy of the
records generated by the Dallas office. This creates a presumption of
computer accuracy and employee fault, which the employee is required to rebut,
without any showing by the Employer where and how and in what particular respects the employee erred. The Employer's conclusions in this case are a
series of inferences drawn from that presumption. To my mind the presumption
and the inferences of employee fault drawn therefrom wrongly shift the
burden of proof from the Employer to the employee.
In short, the trouble with the Employer's case herein is that there
is no specific evidence to explain the source, reasons or even nature of the
imbalances, except that a "bottom-line" shortage was shown by the computer
printout. Not only do we not know what the mistakes were, but it remains
undetermined, as a matter of proof, whether mistakes were actually made,

let alone how.
That errors could arise and were expected to occur in the ordinary
course of dealings and even on a regular basis is evidenced by the $50 rule
itself and the admissions of Company witnesses. That the errors could be
difficult to explain is forcefully revealed by the experience of Mr. Spachman
himself. He described how he drove a truck and ran a route and kept records
for one of the four week periods. He followed the prescribed routine for
making and maintaining records. The route settlement report showed a shortage
of $7. He was unable to "officially reconcile" the shortage. He also conceded
the possibility that shortages might appear as a result of insufficient fund
checks and carried for several periods.*
In order for the Employer to sustain its burden it must show the
source or reason for the shortage and that it was due to employee error.
This may require assigning an employer representative to closely supervise
and analyze records for specified periods. It might require the Company to
assign someone to accompany a salesman on his route for a period of time or
to retrace the employee's route and sales transactions. In the instant case
all that can be said is that the computer showed shortages which neither the
Employer nor the grievants can account for or reconcile. That leaves the matter
of fault undetermined and inconclusive. In any event, the Company cannot shift
the burden to the employee to prove the source of an error in the accounts by
asserting it has confidence in its own computer system and claiming the employee
has the records to prove his innocence.
There is no question that the Company has the authority to establish
a system to assure that it will receive its due and to assure efficiency. It
may change and adjust this system to meet changing conditions and needs. But
it may not shift to the employee the burden of proving he was free of fault.
*In addition a shortage of about $1600, with which Indelicato started the
April 1979 period was reduced to $800. The $1600 represented "shortages"
over a period of time. Records beyond the period which resulted in the $800
shortage were not available. He reimbursed the Company. It cannot be said
that if the Company had relied on these facts, the mere fact of shortage plus
inability to explain by Indelicato would have sustained its burden of proving
the shortages were attributable to Indelicato's incompetence. I also need not
determine whether a $50 or $100 standard is reasonable.

-10The burden of proving the specifics of an employee's alleged fault remains with
the Employer and an accounting or computer system is not a per se substitute
for that obligation.
What the Employer has done is to make the employee an absolute
guarantor of the validity of his transactions and to hold him liable for
discipline if the computer shows shortages. This despite the absence of proof
that the shortages recorded are themselves correct, where and how they
occurred and that they were due to the employee's carelessness, incompetence
or misconduct. In this case the Employer has not shown on an account by
account basis, the elements or particulars of fault attributable to the
grievants which the burden of proof in discharge cases requires.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The discharges of John T. Crawford and Ronald
Indelicato were not for just cause. They shall
be reinstated with seniority and back pay, less
earnings from, gainful employment elsewhere, if
any, during the period of their discharge.

Iric,
J..Schmertz
rbitrator
DATED: February 16, 1931
STATE OF New York )co »
COUNTY OF New York )

On this 16th day of February, 1981, before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration"
Between
Laborers' International Union
of North America, Local 364

and

OPINION

AND

AWARD

Grievance No. L140-80

General Dynamics Corporation
Electric Boat Division

The stipulated issue is:
Was the three day suspension of Arthur
Mackie for just cause? If not, what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Groton, Connecticut on January 12, 1981 at
which time Mr. Mackie, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of 'the above named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The parties filed post-hearing
memoranda.
I find no reason why Superintendant Sebastian, who had not previously
known or dealt with the grievant, would falsify or mistate where he saw the
grievant and what the grievant was doing on October 22, 1980. Nor do I
think his testimony was in error. Rather I accept his testimony as credible
and accurate.
Specifically therefore, I find that the grievant was sitting on the
enclosed fire stairway at building 16-J; that he was not at work at that
location; and that he was either reading or observing what appeared to be a
newspaper or magazine. The grievant's assertion to the contrary, namely that
he was working in a stooped position scooping debris into a plastic bag, is
discounted and rejected.
As I do not accept the grievant's version of what he was doing when
Sebastian came upon him, I also reject his claim that cleaning that stairway
was among his prescribed duties at that time and that he was authorized to
be at that location. The evidence discloses that his specific work assignment, set forth in writing, were in and at other buildings and locations and
that the fire stairway at building 16-J was not part of those enumerated
duties. That he may have cleaned that area at other prior times did not give
him the right to go there this time without a specific work authorization
for that area.
I conclude therefore, as the Company contends, that while he was on
the fire stairway at building 16-J on October 22, 1980 he was away from his
regular work area and work assignments during working time, without authority.
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As the grievant was previously twice disciplined by written warnings,
in July and August 1980, for being out of his work area without permission,
this instant and third offense of the same type of misconduct warrants a more
severe penalty in accordance with the principle of progressive discipline.
Therefore I cannot fault the imposition of the three day suspension.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegattions of the above named parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The three day suspension of Arthur Mackie
was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 26, 1981
STATE OF New York )ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 26th day of January, 1980 before me personally came and
a-peared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Metal Trades Council of New London
County, Laborer's Local 364

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and

General Dynamics Corporation,
Electric Boat Division

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of
grievance L-84-80?
A hearing was held on May 13, 1981 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A steno-

graphic record was taken and briefs were filed.
In and limited to the instant case, I am not prepared to
conclude that the evidence adduced by the Company regarding
available or "adequate manpower", and its work schedule and
assignments for the bargaining unit employees covered by the
grievance together with the fact that no bargaining unit
employees were on lay-off, did not meet the test of enumerated
exceptions to the Article XXX contractual restrictions on the
subcontracting of the demolition work involved.
However, the Arbitrator notes that in his view, Article
XXX creates a presumption against the subcontracting of work
which the bargaining unit normally performs and is capable of
•

performing.
The instant Award, although upholding the Company, should
not be construed as a license allowing the Company to circumvent
the general restrictions on subcontracting, by regular, casual
or unnecessary reliance on the enumerated exceptions.

The proper
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implementation of this section requires a good faith effort
by the Company to restrict its use of subcontractors on
production work and work normally performed by the bargaining
unit.

Again, based on the record before me, I am not prepared

to find an absence of good faith in this case.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Grievance L-84-80 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 2, 1981
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this second day of July, 1981 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

PETER SEITZ
28S CENTRAL PARK WEST
NEW YORK. N. Y. 1OO24
(212)

787-7559

)
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International Union of Electrical, Radio.
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and

':'
AWARD

General Electric Company

\H N U M B E R : 71 30 0262 80

N . D . 62,493

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
1 in

UNDI-:RSK;NED ARBITRATOR(S), h a v i n g been designated in
accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the abovc-nained Parties, and dated
1976-1979 as extended
and having been d u l y sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

The discharge of Brenda Silcott is reduced to a
suspension. She shall be reinstated without back
pay and the period of time between her discharge
and reinstatement shall be the period of her suspension. For purpose of subsequent discipline if
any, the instant fourth warning notice shall be
deemed a reinforcement of the prior third notice
and treated as a third warning notice under the
Company's four warning notice procedure. The period
of time between the date of the fourth warning notice
and the date of this Award shall be tolled and not
counted in calculating any consecutive twelve month
period.
rbitrators signature (dated/

Eric

. Schmertz

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this
came and appeared

5th

day of
Eric J.

January

' 1981 . before me personally

Schmertz

to me k n o w n and k n o w n to me to be the i n d i v i d u a l ( s ) described in and who executed the luiegoing i n s t r u m e n t and he acknowledged to me t h a i he executed the same.

FORM L14-AAA

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, Local
201, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1130 1354 79

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the four-week
suspension of Herbert Fox imposed April
10, 1979? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Boston, Massachusetts on October 6,
1980 at which time Mr. Fox, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and

Company filed post-hearing briefs.
The question is whether Foreman Hammond is telling the truth
when he states that at the relevant time and after the grievant
had himself punched in, he saw the grievant punch another time
card and place it next to another card at a particular location
in the time card rack, and that his examination of both cards at
that location showed neither to be the grievant's, but that one
of them, the card of employee Robinson had been punched a second
time at the critical time involved.
For Hammond to testify falsely means not only that he lied
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about what he says he saw, but also that he must have arranged to
have had Robinson's card punched, or punched it himself, so as to
support an untrue accusation.
than a "frame-up."

Such would constitute nothing less

For reasons to be indicated I do not conclude

that Hammond was so motivated or malevolent.

Rather I accept his

testimony as truthful and accurate.
The inescapable fact is that Robinson's card was punched
twice.

Somebody did it.

both times.

Robinson did not testify that he did it

Hammond's testimony is the only explanation in the

record for how it happened.

Significantly the Union witnesses

who testified that they were at or around the time clock at the
critical time and that they did not see Hammond in that vicinity
did not testify how the time card got punched or who punched it.
If indeed they were at that location at that time they were in a
position to offer some testimony on this highly critical point.
The absence of any such testimony when otherwise they were able
to testify with certainty as to what they did and that they did
not see Hammond, suggests only one logical conclusion, and that
is that there is no other explanation to refute what Hammond said
he saw.

Also it is not surprising that those witnesses did not

see Hammond.

Two of them admittedly, were racing from a faster

time clock at another location to the slower clock at this location
to get punched in before being recorded late.

With that single

purpose in mind it is not surprising that they did not see Hammond
(who, significantly, testified that those two employees, one whom
he identified, raced past him going from one clock to the other).
The other witnesses who placed themselves at the clock at the
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critical time testified that they engaged in some horseplay with
the two who had raced to that clock.

Under that circumstance

their attention was not en who else might have been in the vicinity
with a view of the time clock.
The Union's position on why Hammond would lie and willfully
construct a false case against the grievant is based solely on
hearsay testimony, which, on such an essential matter cannot be
credited as probative.
It is well settled that the willful punching of another
employees time card, for whatever reason and for whatever time
is involved, is a serious offense warranting discipline.
Company's Code of Plant Conduct so provides.

The

The validity of

the Code and the propriety of a disciplinary suspension for that
violation has been established by prior arbitration decisions
between the parties under this or applicable predecessor contracts
Under the Code, punching another employee's time card is a per se
offense.

It is not conditioned upon how much misrepresentation of

time is involved, nor, irrespective of the type of the prior
cases that have arisen, does it limit the disciplinary suspension
to where collusion between two or more employees is found to be
the basis of the improper punch.

The Code rule, as is tradition-

ally the case, is designed to deter any punching of another's
time card under any circumstances and for any amount of time, and
that is why the bare act, otherwise unexplained, is a disciplinary
*
offense.

Therefore here, in the absence of any showing that the

card was punched in error or otherwise without intent, or other
explanation or circumstance which might be considered in mitigation,

-4I cannot reverse or reduce the penalty just because only a few
minutes of time were involved, or because there was no discernible logic or rational reason for the grievant to have done it,
or even because of the grievant's good prior record.

Rather,

considering the provisions of the Code and the unconditional prohibition on the willful punching of another's time card, I cannot
find that the four-week disciplinary suspension imposed on the
grievant was improper or excessive.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the four-week
suspension for Herbert Fox.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 26, 1980
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 26th day of December, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to be known and know to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
Local 734

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #5230 0328 79
ND 55627

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the termination of Beverly Hamilton
on November 21, 1977 appropriate under
the circumstances? If not, what shall
the remedy be?
A hearing was held in Youngstown, Ohio on August 14, 1980,
at which time Ms. Hamilton hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived, a stenographic record was taken,
and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Whether treated disciplinarily or a matter of managerial
authority, it is well settled generally as well as under the
collective bargaining relationship between this Union and Company
that employees with records of chronic absenteeism regardless of
reason or fault, and with no reasonable prospect for improvement
to a satisfactory level of attendance may be terminated or discharged.

Universally accepted is the principle that an employer,

to maintain production or services, is entitled to and may require
a reliability of attendance from his employees.

However, in my

-2view, under either theory, the employer must demonstrate just
cause for the termination or discharge.
In the instant case I conclude that the grievant had compiled
a record of excessive absences that was largely beyond her fault
or control, that the Company did not over-estimate or statistically exaggerate the quantity, and that it was not unreasonable
for the Company to determine that requisite improvement to a
level of acceptable attendance would not occur if her employment
continued.
Though the Union raises allegations of "disparate treatment"
I do not find in the record probative evidence showing that other
employees with similar attendance problems were not dealt with
similarly or that the grievant was singled out for termination
or otherwise discriminated against.
In my view the issue narrows to whether the grievant's termination should have followed the traditional process and principle of "progressive discipline" by warning and suspension befor
discharge and have been subject to the disciplinary standard of
"just cause",' or whether it could be achieved, under the Company's
theory, as a "non-disciplinary" or administrative termination by
its "Two Letter Approach" (i.e. one warning letter followed by a
second letter and termination, if not improvement.)
The record before me includes several prior arbitration
decisions between these parties under the same management rights
and other contract clauses upholding the Company's right to
terminate "administratively" or "non-disciplinarily" for chronic

-3-

1

and unimproveable absenteeism.
Despite any different approach I might consider had this
issue come to me as a matter of "first impression," and despite
the general view elsewhere that absenteeism regardless of reason
or fault is a disciplinary offense calling for progressive steps
of warning and suspension before discharge, I do not disagree
with the Company's assertion that a disciplinary suspension in
such as the instant case would not be rehabilitative.
find those prior Awards to be wrong.

Nor do I

Hence I choose not to

consider disturbing or reversing them or applying a different
rule to this grievance.

Rather I find that the Company's Two

Letter Approach in this case is nothing more than the implementation of its right, as sustained in similar forms

by prior

arbitration decisions, to remove from the payroll an employee
who unfortunately is unable to maintain adequate attendance.

No

matter what the theory, I conclude that the grievant's poor
attendance record, and its continuation following the first
letter meets the substantive test of "just cause."

Therefore

under those prior decisions, the Company is not barred from so
acting procedurally.
Accordingly I deem it unecessary and immaterial to precisely

1. See cited decisions of panel arbitrators Larkin, Brown,
Gregory, St. Antoine, and Wildebush.

-4determine whether the grievant's termination was "administrative"
or "disciplinary."
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The termination of Beverly Hamilton
on November 21, 1977 was appropriate
under the circumstances.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:

December 31, 1980

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers Local 761, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #52 30 0066 80

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article XXV of
the 1976-1979 GE - IUE National Agreement when it denied payment to certain
identified employees for absences during the period April 26th and May 8th,
1978? If so what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky on July 16, 1980
at which time representatives of the above named Company and
Union appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

On April 26th, 1978 the Machinists Union Lodge 2409 commenced
a strike against the Company.

The "identified employees" referr-

ed to in the stipulated issue, and hereinafter referred to as the
grievants, together with other members of the IUE, hereinafter
referred to as the Union, respected the picket line.

Sometime

after the beginning of the Machinists' strike but before May 1,
1978 the grievants went on jury duty.

On May 1 the Company ob-

tained a temporary restraining order enjoining the Union and its
members from any further respect of the Machinists

picket line.

The grievants completed their jury duty subsequent to the issuance
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of the restraining order.
24, 1978.

The Machinists strike ended on July

Article XXV provides in pertinent part:
1. When an hourly-paid employee is
called for service as a juror he will
be paid the difference between the fee
he receives for such service and the
amount of straight-time earnings lost
by him by reason of such service, up to
a limit of 8 hours per day and 40 hours
per week.
The grievants claim jury duty pay for the dates subsequent
to May 1 that they were on jury duty.

The Union asserts that

but for their service on the jury, the grievants would have
complied with the restraining order and returned to work on May
2, 1978, and therefore are entitled to jury duty pay for the
period May 2 until their jury duty ended.
In its simplest terms the question for determination is
whether the grievants, who respected the Machinists picket line
prior to commencement of their jury duty service, would have but
for that service, returned to work on May 2, 1978 in compliance
with the restraining order.

If so they would be entitled to the

difference between their pay as a juror and their straight-time
earnings loss by reason of jury duty service.

And if not, be-

cause no earnings were lost under circumstances where they would
have continued their respect of the Machinists picket line, they
would not be entitled to the jury duty pay.
The status of the record before me, largely because of the
speculative and special circumstances of this case, is wholly
inadequate to substantively determine the issue, one way or the
other.

-3The Arbitrator is not a mind reader.

He cannot crawl into

the minds of the grievants and find out whether on May 2, 1978
each of them, or some of them, or all of them would have returned
to work in compliance with the restraining order but for their
service on a jury.
The testimony of the two "representative" grievants is
hardly probative evidence of what the other grievants would have
done.

More particularly I find their testimony to be inconclusive

and equivocal with regard to what they would have done themselves.
I believe that neither the Company nor the Union knows
whether the grievants would or would not have promptly complied
with the restraining order had they not been on jury duty.

In-

deed, by the date of the arbitration hearing, more than two years
after the effective date of the restraining order, I do not
think that the grievants, including the two who testified, would
know, retroactively, whether but for their service on the jury
they would have been at work beginning May 2, 1978.

The fact is

that on May 2nd, 1978 the grievants were not directly confronted
with the question.

They were on jury duty and I doubt they gave

attention at that moment to whether they would have reported to
work in compliance with the restraining order if they had not
been on jury duty, or whether they would have continued to respect
the Machinists picket line for some days thereafter.

In short,

the precise question was not then before them because of their
physical presence on a jury.
Arbitration decisions are based on facts, probative evidence
and contract interpretation.

Here, as I have indicated above,

-4the facts and evidence are respectively too speculative and too
prophetic to meet the test of what is required to prove a
grievance.
The record does indicate that many Union members who were
not on jury duty did not promptly comply with the restraining
order but rather returned to work sporadically over several days
following May 2nd, with some not back until May 5th at the earliest
The Company asserts, without refutation, that one or two grievants
did not return until several days later even though they had
completed their jury duty on May 5th.

I think it impossible to

determine, based on the record, whether the grievants would or
would not have been among them.
This is not to say that the grievants would have disobeyed
the law by disobeying the restraining order.

Rather it is to say

that I can no more conclude that they would have promptly complied
than they would not have complied.

That they concededly respected

the Machinists picket line from April 26th to the date they went
on jury duty, an action of questionable legality in view of the
subsequent restraining order, creates as much a presumption that
they would have continued to respect the picket line for some
days following the restraining order as the contrary presumption
that in the face of an injunction they would have obeyed the law
and complied with the order.
As the burden is on the Union to prove the grievance and
considering my foregoing view that the record is inadequate to
determine one way or the other what the grievants would have
done regarding the restraining order had they not been on jury
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duty, that burden has not been met.

Hence the Union has not

proved that the grievants lost straight-time earnings within
the meaning of Article XXV Section 1 of the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article XXV
of the 1976-1979 GE - IUE National Agreement when it denied payment to certain
identified employees for absences during
the period April 26th and May 8th, 1978.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 19, 1980
STATE OF New York )__
.
oo. .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 19th day of December, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical, Radio
& Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 782

OPINION
Case #71 30 0262 80
N.D. 62,493

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discharge of Brenda Silcott for
just cause? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on October 10, 1980 in Tyler, Texas at
which time Ms. Silcott, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The parties filed post-hearing briefs.
There are a few occasions when an otherwise valid managerial
procedure generates too harsh a result. In that event, though
the procedure should not be assailed, the result should be tempered. That is the circumstance in this case.
The Company's "four warning notice" procedure is a proper
exercise of its managerial authority. It provides for the penalty of discharge for an employee who receives a fourth disciplinary notice within a twelve month period. The grievant, who had
received three disciplinary warnings within the preceding twelve
month period, received a fourth for failing to report for work
on June 19, 1980 in violation of a Company rule.
The grievant reported for work on June 10, 1980 with an
injured and stitched forearm. The Company sent her home and
would not permit her to work until the arm healed and until her
physician and the Company's medical service approved her return
to work. She resumed work at midnight June 20, 1980 after being
cleared during the day on June 19 by the Company's medical service. The Company learned on the 19th that she had been released
by her own doctor on June 18 at about 4 PM and could have reported to the Company's medical service and resumed work at midnight
June 19th. She received the fourth warning notice because her
absence on June 19 was not authorized. In other words, in the
Company's view, she should have returned to work on her next
regularly scheduled shift, about eight hours after she was cleared by her own doctor and not a day later.
Frankly I do not consider this much of an offense. If it
is a violation of the work rule which prohibits absences without
authorization, it is a technical violation. From June 10 the
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grievant was authorized to be absent because of her disability.
From the time she left work that day she regularly reported by
phone to her foreman indicating virtually each day her condition
and that she would not be in. She did the same on June 18th,
although at 11:55 PM, five minutes before the start of the June
19th midnight shift, but also stated at that time that she would
be in to work the next day. So rather than an unexpected or unexcused absence on June 19th, her failure to report that day so
far as her foreman was concerned was nothing more than a noticed
continuation of her absence since June 10th. There is no evidence
that her department planned work or adjusted its production
schedule to accomodate her return any earlier than June 20th.
Though the department worked with one employee short there is no
evidence that production or work schedules were curtailed or disrupted because of her absence on June 19th.
Though the Company claims deception and cover up on the
grievant's part to gain an extra day off, I do not see so thick
a plot. It is noted she came to work on June 10th with the arm
injury and presumably would have worked that day and thereafter
had the Company not ordered her to leave and stay out until the
injury healed. If she wanted to work then I am not prepared to
conclude now that after being approved for reemployment by her
doctor at 4 PM on June 18th she willfully did not return to work
the same day only because she wanted the extra day off. Rather,
because it was as late as 4 PM I think she simply believed that
it would not matter to the Company whether she resumed work that
night or the next night, particularly since she had been out of
work since June 10. Though perhaps a technical error, I do not
think it so illogical or unreasonable for an employee under those
circumstances to believe that a return to work the next day would
be in compliance with the work rules. I agree with the Company
that she made certain misstatements to the nurse and to her fore-1
man about when she was released by her own doctor and why she did
not report for the June 19th shift. But I believe she did so nol
as a cover up for a pre-planned scheme to gain an extra day off,
but because on June 19 she learned that her delay a day in returning to work was being construed by the Company as a serious rule
violation and she then foolishly compounded her initial error by
those misstatements. But I am not persuaded that she set out to
deceive the Company or to defraud it of time off.
This is not to say that the grievant is blameless. She
should have known that she was to return to work as soon as her
disability ended. If she was uncertain whether that meant within eight hours or a day later she should have made full disclosute,
sought guidance and obtained the Company's permission if her return to work was to be delayed. Also in this case, the grievant
was less than fully truthful.
Additionally her prior record
is not good and that is relevant to the measure of penalty. (However the events which occurred after she was dismissed, particularly her intemperate and threatening conduct towards her foreman is not relevant to the issue of just cause in this case,
though it may be grounds for other discipline.) Yet, in light
of the short period of time between when she should have returned
and when she did return, her strict compliance with the rule to
call in each day when she was legitimately out due to the

-3disability, the lack of damage to or disruption of the Company's
work schedule and production, and my finding that she did not
intend to defraud, I remain convinced that the automatic imposition of the penalty of discharge is too harsh. What is
appropriate is a suspension. As the disposition of this case
is largely on equitable grounds and the grievant is to be restored
to her job, I do not think it fair or proper to impose any
monetary liability on the Company. Therefore despite the period
of time that has elapsed from the discharge to the arbitration,
the grievant's reinstatement shall be without any back pay.
Also this determination should not prejudice the Company's four
warning notice procedure. Therefore the time that elapsed from
the date of the fourth warning notice to the date of this
arbitration Award shall not be calculated in any consecutive
twelve month period as applied to the grievant.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
January 5, 1981

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, Local
359

A W A R D
Case #1530 0750 80
N.D. 65905

and
General Electric Company, Silicone
Products Division

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Within the meaning of the provisions
of the second sentence of Section 1
of Article XXVIII of the contract as
previously interpreted and applied
by this Arbitrator, the grievant, Mark
A. Sheehan did not have the minimum
qualifications to be upgraded to the
Control Operator job (R20) in the Methyl
Siloxane Production Unit in Building 27
on April 20, 1980.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 20, 1981
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 20th day of September, 1981, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, Local
359

OPINION
Case #1530 0750 80
N.D. 65905

and
General Electric Company, Silicon
Products Division

The stipulated issue is:
"Did the grievant, Mark A. Sheehan,
have the minimum qualifications required under the provisions of the
second sentence of Section 1 of Article
XXVIII to be upgraded to a Control
Operator job (R-20) in the Methyl
Siloxane Production Unit in Building
27 on April 21, 1980?"
"If the Arbitrator finds that the grievant did have the minimum qualifications
required for such upgrading, did the
Company violate Article XXVIII when it
upgraded Albert Truax to the job rather
than the grievant? If so, what shall
the remedy be?"
Hearings were held in Latham, New York on March 24 and
May 4, 1981 at which time representatives of the above named
Union and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic

record was taken and both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
I have taken additional time to study the record in this
matter to determine whether this case is the one in which I shoul

-2consider reconsidering my previously enunciated

interpretation

of the second sentence of Section 1 of Article XXVIII of the
contract."

I conclude that it is not.

In Case #1130 0745 79 I stated in connection with the
difference between my interpretation of the foregoing contract
provisions and the Wirtz formula that:
"This is not to say that this arbitrator
is obdurately wedded to his prior decisions.
Rather, those decision, interpreting the
very contract clause in question in the instant case and under the same collective
bargaining agreement must be accorded at
least a presumption of continued validity
and applicability unless in a subsequent
proceeding that interpretation is appropriately relitigated, I am asked or required
to reconsider my prior ruling, and I am shown
that that prior ruling was wrong.
The trouble with the Union's case in the
present matter before me is that it does
not reargue the critical contract interpretation involved and it does not ask that
I reconsider my prior interpretative ruling."
In the case at hand the Union has again not relitigated
that question.

Aside from a passing reference to the difference

in interpretations among panel arbitrators, the Union, particularly in Mr. Shambo's testimony again relies on the Wirtz formula
and a history of negotiations between the parties involving that
formula.

It did so with little or no regard for the obvious fact

that I had placed a different interpretation on the same contract
provision in four prior cases under the National Agreement, and
*International Union Electric, Radio & Machine Workers, Local 300
AFL-CIO and General Electric Company, AAA Case #1530 0217 77,
October 13, 1977 (Schenectady); International Union Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers,AFL-CIO and General Electric Company, AAA
Case #5330 0345 77, February 17, 1977 (Cleveland) and Internationa 1
Union Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers Local 707, AFL-CIO and
General Electric Company, AAA Case #5330 0040 78, January, 1979
Cleveland.

-3without probative demonstration of how and why I was wrong.

The

Union does argue the matter to some extent in its brief, but that
is not enough to persuade me to consider reconsidering my prior
rulings.

For the Union to seek reversal of my prior interpre-

tation and for the Company to be given its rightful opportunity
to seek an affirmation of that interpretation - in other words
for the issue to be properly joined - it must be part of the
adversary arbitration hearing at least, and preferably reargued
in the briefs as well.
Though the Company cites and relies on my prior decisions
in its brief, the Union's failure to specifically relitigate and
challenge the validity of my interpretation as part of its case
in the arbitration hearing, negated the possible review of that
interpretation under the necessary circumstance - namely in the
adversary and adjudicatory forum of the arbitration hearing.
A final word about the difference between my

interpretation

of the critical contract language and the Wirtz formula is in
order.

I do not ignore relevant prior rulings and prior inter-

pretations of other arbitrators.

I am most respectful of Mr.

Wirtz as a distinguished arbitrator and lawyer and I do not
quarrel with the logic and interpretative reasonableness of the
Wirtz formula.

My own interpretation came about because in the

first case in which I enunciated

it, the issue was presented or

appeared to be presented by the parties as one of first impressio
My records and my recollection

indicate that the Wirtz formula

was not made a part of the record in that particular first case

-4before me involving this particular issue.

Therefore the Wirtz

formula, which I may well have respected and accorded precedential weight consistent with my respect for arguably logical
decisions by other arbitrators on the same point in dispute, was
not accorded that consideration simply because it was not then
before me.

As a consequence, I interpreted the critical contract

language de novo, believing, as I indicated, that it was a matter
not previously dealt with.

Having done so I established a

precedent of my own which I believe is as logical and correct
as the Wirtz formula, and towhich I am bound unless the difference

between my interpretation and the Wirtz formula is put to

a full adversarial test.

This requirement has not been met in

the instant case.
Based on my interpretation of the critical contract
language and the record on the merits I do not find that the
Company's determination that the grievant lacked the minimum
qualifications to be upgraded to the job of Control Operator in
the Methyl Siloxane Production Unit was without a rational and
logical basis.

Hence that determination was not arbitrary,

capricious or an abuse of discretion within the meaning of my
prior cited decisions.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

